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“After all, the international financial system is a set of interlocking parts. 
No single reform may significantly improve its performance 
characteristics, or be feasible, in the absence of other, complementary 
reform.”  
 
(Barry Eichengreen) 
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Die vorliegende Arbeit umfasst drei Aufsätze, die versuchen, einen Beitrag zur Debatte über 
die Ausgestaltung eines (rein marktbasierten) vertraglichen Ansatzes zur Umschuldung von 
Staatsanleihen aufstrebender Volkswirtschaften zu leisten. Ein Schwerpunkt der Arbeit liegt 
dabei auf dem Problem mangelhafter Koordination unter den Anleihebesitzern.  
Obwohl eine inhaltliche Verbindung besteht, ist jeder dieser Aufsätze als eine eigenständige 
Einheit zu betrachten. 
Aufsatz I (Kapitel II): Bei der jüngsten Umschuldung argentinischer Staatsanleihen kam es 
zum ersten Mal in der neueren Geschichte von Finanzkrisen dazu, dass die Krisenbewältigung 
ein vollständig marktbasierter Prozess ohne Intervention des öffentlichen Sektors war. In 
diesem Aufsatz wird dargestellt, in welcher Form der hieraus resultierende höchste 
Forderungsverzicht von privaten Investoren in der Geschichte der Umschuldung staatlicher 
Anleihen zumindest teilweise auf eine mangelhafte Koordination im Rahmen eines Assurance-
Spiels unter den Gläubigern zurückgeführt werden kann. Außerdem bestehen für den Schuldner 
im Rahmen eines solchen Spiels Anreize, die hieraus entstehenden Probleme in der 
Koordination der Anleihebesitzer durch bestimmte vertragliche Elemente zu seinem Vorteil 
auszunutzen. Die Analyse zeigt, dass im Gegensatz zur Wahrnehmung in der Literatur die 
Effekte von so genannten „Exit Consents“ und „Collective Action Clauses“ nicht identisch 
sind. Hätten die Anleihen Argentiniens derartige Mehrheitsklauseln aufgewiesen, hätte die 
Koordination unter den Gläubigern hiervon profitiert.  
Aufsatz II (Kapitel III): Umschuldungsverhandlungen des letzten Jahrzehnts haben gezeigt, 
dass Angebote des Schuldners zum Tausch alter gegen neue Anleihen das bis dato 
vorherrschende Prozedere für die Anpassung der vertraglichen Rückzahlungsvereinbarungen 
darstellt. Die Verhandlungen zwischen Gläubiger- und Schuldnerseite über die Details dieser 
Anpassung bewegen sich dabei im Rahmen eines Ultimatum-Spiels, bei dem der Schuldner 
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praktisch über die gesamte Verhandlungsmacht verfügt. Gläubiger entscheiden über die 
Annahme eines solchen Angebotes aufgrund eines Reservationswertes, welcher durch 
Fairnessempfindungen gegenüber dem Schuldner sowie den übrigen Gläubigern beeinflusst 
werden kann. Die Subjektivität solcher Empfindungen kann dabei zur Heterogenität der 
Reservationswerte führen, was sich wiederum negativ auf die Effektivität der Koordination 
unter Anleihebesitzern auswirken kann. Der Schuldner wäre dann in der Lage, diese 
mangelhafte Effektivität zu seinem Vorteil auszunutzen. 
Aufsatz III (Kapitel IV): Ein zentraler Aspekt verschiedener Vorschläge für einen 
institutionalisierten Prozess der Restrukturierung von Staatsanleihen ist seit jeher die 
Vermeidung von Mängeln der Koordination unter den Anleihegläubigern. Ein Umstand findet 
hierbei bisher jedoch noch nicht ausreichend Beachtung: Der momentan vorherrschende 
Prozess von Umschuldungsverhandlungen ermöglicht es dem Schuldner, den Gläubigern 
Angebote über den Austausch der entsprechenden Anleihen zu unterbreiten. Für das 
Schuldnerland bietet die Gestaltungsfreiheit derartiger Angebote jedoch einen Anreiz, 
zwischen verschiedenen Typen von Gläubigern zeitlich zu diskriminieren. Obwohl dies für den 
Schuldner vorteilhaft ist, führt eine Diskriminierung zu einem verlängerten und damit 
ineffizienten Umschuldungsprozess. Lediglich eine effektive Gläubigervertretung, welche alle 
Gläubiger in ein gemeinsames Votum mit einbinden kann, wäre in der Lage, dies zu 
verhindern. Eine Erweiterung der aktuellen Vorschläge zur Bildung von „Creditor Groups“ 
könnte hierbei helfen, den Umschuldungsprozess vor derartigen Mängeln der 
Gläubigerkoordination zu schützen. Daher skizziert dieser Aufsatz eine derartige 
Gläubigervertretung, welche in ihrer Funktionsweise Ähnlichkeit mit einer vergleichbaren 
Institution im vorletzten Jahrhundert hat. 
Abschließend lassen sich damit die Aussagen der Aufsätze wie folgt zusammenfassen: Der 
aktuelle Status des vertraglichen Ansatzes der Umschuldung von Staatsanleihen aufstrebender 
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Volkswirtschaften ist aufgrund des Mangels einer umfassenden und wirkungsvollen 
Gläubigervertretung noch nicht in der Lage, eine effektive Koordination unter den 
Anleihebesitzern zu gewährleisten. Die Einrichtung einer derartigen Gläubigervertretung 
würde die institutionelle Entwicklung während der Hochzeit der Anleihemärkte im vorletzten 
Jahrhundert nachzeichnen, welche zu einer signifikanten Verbesserung in der 
Gläubigerkoordination geführt hat. Und da das Ergebnis eines potentiellen 
Umschuldungprozesses auch einen Einfluss auf die ex-ante-Investitionsentscheidung des 
einzelnen Anleihebesitzers hat, könnte dies einen Beitrag zu den wohlfahrtserhöhenden 
Effekten einer Außenfinanzierung aufstrebender Volkswirtschaften durch private 
Anleihegläubiger leisten.  
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This work is comprised of three essays that attempt to contribute to the task of reviewing the 
prevailing (solely market-based) contractual approach for sovereign debt restructuring. These 
essays particularly focus on aspects of intra-creditor coordination. Although the content of 
these essays is interconnected, each unit is a stand-alone entity. 
Essay I (Chapter II):  The latest Argentinean debt restructuring was the first time the resolution 
of a modern financial crisis was completely handed over to the private financial markets 
without official intervention by public institutions. This essay argues that the resulting harshest 
haircut for private creditors in history can be at least partially related to an assurance game 
played by creditors. It shows that incentive schemes provided by the Argentinean government 
were factors facilitating this haircut. The analysis suggests that, contrary to the recognition in 
the literature, the effects of Collective Action Clauses and Exit Consents within a restructuring 
process are not equal. In the case of Argentina, the inclusion of Collective Action Clauses in 
the defaulted bonds could have benefited the holdout creditors. 
Essay II (Chapter III):  Experience from events of sovereign debt restructuring over the last 
decade shows that the prevailing process is mainly shaped by exchange-offers launched by the 
debtor. This suggests that negotiations for changing the repayment terms of the debt take place 
in an ultimatum game which centers virtually all bargaining power on the debtor side. Creditors 
vote according to reservations values that might be influenced by fairness consideration both 
vis-à-vis the debtor and their fellow creditors. And, as fairness is usually a highly subjective 
influence, this can result in a heterogeneity of reservation values which might impede effective 
intra-creditor coordination for the benefit of the debtor.  
Essay III (Chapter IV):  Mitigating intra-creditor coordination failures has always been crucial 
in any proposal for an institutionalized process of restructuring sovereign bonds. However, one 
source of failure in creditor coordination has not been taken into consideration. The current 
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process of sovereign debt restructuring enables the debtor to launch an exchange offer which 
provides incentives to inter-temporally discriminate among creditors with different reservation 
values. Only a creditor representation that can effectively bind in all different creditor types 
will mitigate this failure and thereby prevent potential conflicts of interests among creditors. 
Enhancing the current proposal of creditor groups so that creditors can effectively pre-commit 
can shield the process from this kind of coordination failure. This essay concludes with a 
proposal for a creation of a creditor representation body which exhibits a similar mode of 
operation as a celebrated institutionalized creditor representation body in the penultimate 
century.  
To summarize the conclusions drawn from these essays, the contractual approach is not yet 
able to guarantee effective creditor coordination due to a lack of a comprehensive and forceful 
permanent creditor representation. Establishing such a permanent representation body would 
replicate the institutional development experienced during the last heydays of bonds as a source 
of emerging market financing. This would lead to a significant improvement in creditor 
coordination. Moreover, since the result of a potential debt restructuring draws back to the ex-
ante lending decision by the individual investor, this improvement could contribute to the 
welfare-enhancing effects of external financing by private creditors for developing economies. 
Content 
 8
I. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 10 
I.1. Sovereign Debt Restructuring in the Bretton Woods Era ..................................... 10 
I.2. The Economics of Sovereign Debt Restructuring ................................................. 13 
I.3. Creditor Coordination in Recent Cases of Debt Exchange-Offers ........................ 16 
I.4. The International Financial Architecture and the Contractual Approach ............. 18 
I.5. Three Papers on Intra-creditor Coordination Failures ........................................... 19 
II. Assurance Game in Argentinean Debt Restructuring .................................................. 21 
II.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 21 
II.2. The Exchange-offer ............................................................................................... 24 
II.3. The Stag-hunt Game .............................................................................................. 26 
II.4. Coordination in a Stag-hunt Game ........................................................................ 28 
II.5. Effects of a Most Favoured Creditor Clause (MFC) ............................................. 33 
II.6. Effects of a Bonus Payment .................................................................................. 35 
II.7. Differences between Collective Action Clauses and Exit Consents ..................... 38 
II.8. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 40 
II.9. Appendix ............................................................................................................... 42 
A.1. The case of n-Players .......................................................................................... 42 
III. Social Preferences in Sovereign Debt Restructuring.................................................... 45 
III.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 45 
III.2. Restructuring as an Ultimatum Game ................................................................... 47 
III.3. Heterogeneity among Creditors ............................................................................. 52 
Content 
 9
III.4. Fairness and Reservation Values ........................................................................... 54 
III.5. Herding and Intra-Creditor Fairness ...................................................................... 59 
III.6. Fairness and Majority Voting ................................................................................ 61 
III.7. Fairness in a Bondholder Meeting ......................................................................... 63 
III.8. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 64 
IV. Inter-temporal Discrimination among Creditors .......................................................... 67 
IV.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 67 
IV.2. From Private Sector Involvement to Private Sector Ownership ........................... 69 
IV.3. Heterogeneity and Inter-temporal Discrimination ................................................ 77 
IV.4. Pre-Commitment via a Creditor Trust ................................................................... 84 
IV.5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 89 
IV.6. Appendix ............................................................................................................... 91 
A.1. The “No Gap Case” with Infinite Bargaining ..................................................... 91 
A.2. A Representation Clause ..................................................................................... 94 
V. Description of recent Crises ......................................................................................... 97 
V.1. Details of Restructuring Terms ............................................................................. 97 
V.2. Details of Creditor Coordination ......................................................................... 102 
VI. References .................................................................................................................. 105 
 
I. Introduction 
 10
I. Introduction1 
I.1. Sovereign Debt Restructuring in the Bretton Woods Era 
It has always been an integral feature of the international financial system that sovereign 
debtors – mostly emerging economies – experience boom-bust cycles, times of financial 
distress, and defaults and restructurings. Even the enhanced multilateral cooperation 
institutionalized in the Bretton Woods system after WWII was not able to shield the 
international credit markets from disputes with countries claiming their inability to fulfill their 
legal repayment obligations. The nature of and the mechanism to solve these disputes, 
however, has changed over time resulting from a shift in the structure of capital flows to 
emerging market countries. 
When international lending resumed after the war in the 1970s it was mostly in the form of 
syndicated bank loans from international commercial banks. Supported by the advent of the 
Eurodollar market, this lead to what was called the “the recycling of the Petrodollars.”2 
Satisfying the increasing need for external financing caused by widening trade deficits in 
developing countries brought an attractive investment opportunity for an increasing liquidity 
among banks that resulted from the current account surpluses of the oil-exporting countries. 
But these loans were mostly short-term, denominated in foreign currency and contained 
variable interest rates which after an imprudent risk management by the creditor banks gave 
rise to an unsustainable debt burden for these countries leading to the debt crises of the 1980s. 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated the material for this chapter is mostly drawn from Roubini and Setser (2004), Rieffel 
(2003), IADB (2006), Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006), Eichengreen (2003) and Mauro and Yafeh (2003).  
2 Eurodollars are U.S. Dollar denominated deposits at banks located outside the United States. 
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Starting with Mexico declaring its inability to repay its debt in August of 1982, this crisis 
infected many countries in Latin America and had severe economic consequences which lead 
to what was later called the “lost decade” for this region.  
The international financial system was also substantially affected by this crisis. Because 
commercial banks in the advanced economies contained sizable credit exposures to defaulting 
countries the financial soundness of these institutions was at risk. In the U.S., for example, at 
least four of the largest banks were prone to exposures that exceeded their total capital. Since a 
breakdown of these banks could have been a major threat to the stability of the international 
financial system of that time this made the restructuring of the defaulted loans extremely 
difficult. In consequence, the financial authorities orchestrated several rescheduling agreements 
between the debtor countries and the creditor banks in order to buy time so that the banks could 
accumulate enough capital to absorb the losses resulting from a write-down of their claims.3 
Bargaining of the details of any rescheduling – and later restructuring – agreement, however, 
was left to bilateral negotiations between debtor and creditor. After several years of 
rescheduling this finally led to the announcement by the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Nicolas 
Brady in March 1989 of an initiative to solve this situation which was later called the “Brady-
Plan.” This plan provided incentives for debtor countries and their creditors to restructure the 
defaulted bank loans into bonds with significant write-downs on the claims. The goal of this – 
in the end, successful – strategy was two-sided. On the one hand the write-down enabled debtor 
countries to return to a sustainable debt payment path, and on the other the creditor banks were 
given an opportunity to liquidate these bonds on the secondary market, receiving at least the 
current market value of their claims. 
                                                 
3 In contrast to a restructuring, a rescheduling lacks a substantial reduction of the net present value of the future 
debt payments.  
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The resulting issuance of “Brady bonds” marked the return of a well known platform for 
emerging market financing: the bond market. Bonds had already been the primary source of 
financing for developing countries between 1820 and 1930 until international lending ran dry 
in the onset of the Second World War. The renaissance of bond financing started when the 
crisis countries reached restructuring agreements with their creditor banks which initiated the 
development of an active and liquid secondary market for emerging market bonds. Today, 
emerging market bonds represent 32 percent of total government debt securities outstanding 
(IADB 2006: 84). Further highlighting the maturing of the market, debtor countries have 
displaced nearly all of the initial Brady bonds with newly issued Eurobonds and global bonds, 
partially to prevent the remembering of the tainted past of the 1980 debt crisis.4 Large parts of 
the 1990s bonds have even replaced bank loans as the primary vehicle for external financing 
(see figure below).  
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4 A Eurobond is a debt instrument denominated in a currency different from the issuing country. A global bond, in 
contrast, is denominated in the issuing country’s currency but is offered on several markets simultaneously. 
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In consequence, all major debt crises which necessitated a restructuring since the Brady-Plan 
involved bondholders instead of commercial banks as the largest group of private creditors.  
I.2. The Economics of Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
When a country asks its private creditors for the restructuring of its debt obligation there are 
two explanations for this request: Either the country is not able to repay the debt (e.g., because 
its economy has been hit by a negative shock) or it is simply not willing to pay its debt.5 
Although the distinction between the two motives seems to be easy in theory it is highly 
complex in practice. Because the debtor is a tax-collecting government, determining the largest 
possible but still economically sustainable debt level is nearly impossible for several reasons. 
First, uncertainty of the future economic development of the country prohibits the precise 
prediction of future primary budget surpluses which are the main ingredients of any 
fundamental debt sustainability analysis. Second, information asymmetries prevent the 
creditors from identifying the exact degree of effort the debtor will undertake to foster its 
repayment capacity through economic adjustment. And third, the sovereignty of the debtor 
forecloses a guarantee for creditors that no future government will exercise its sovereign 
immunity and repudiate its external obligations. Hence, any repayment schedule must also take 
the political sustainability of the resulting fiscal adjustment measures – higher tax burden and 
lower public spending – into consideration. This enriches the topic of sovereign debt 
restructuring with a political level further complicating the analysis of sustainability. Moreover, 
                                                 
5 It is important to note that this work solely focuses on the restructuring need of an insolvent debtor which 
requires a write-down in debt payments. Thereby it circumvents the complex issue of illiquidity and the threat of 
moral hazard resulting from potential official sector intervention. The resolution of liquidity crises in emerging 
markets can also be prone to intra-creditor coordination failures turning a liquidity into a solvency crises. For a 
survey on this debate see Roubini and Setser (2004) and Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006), as well as Rieffel 
(2003).  
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without a precise assignation of the still sustainable debt level the restructuring exercise 
becomes a matter of discretion highly influenced by the design of the bargaining process 
between the debtor country and its private creditors. 
Concerning this design of the negotiations between debtor and creditors the process of 
exchange-offers has become the vehicle of choice since the revival of bond financing for 
emerging market debtors. Thereby the debtor offers to exchange old bonds tendered by the 
creditors for newly issued ones containing amended financial terms.6 Amended financial terms 
of these new bonds mostly bring a reduction in the net present value of the future debt 
payments representing a reduction of the debtor’s indebtedness – commonly referred to as a 
“haircut.” Bondholders can then either accept the exchange-offer and receive the new bond or 
reject and hold on to the old bonds. This shows that the process of exchange-offers is 
characterized by three elements: the inside option in case of acceptation, the outside option in 
case of rejection and the voting procedure. While accepting creditors receive the restructuring 
terms offered the yield from rejection is not that obvious. Bondholders can either continue to 
bargain aiming at more favorable restructuring terms or consider taking legal action against the 
debtor. But both alternatives, however, are associated with a certain degree of uncertainty 
because, concerning the former alternative, the achievement of any future bargaining is 
significantly influenced by the behavior of all fellow creditors so that the results are prone to 
coordination failures – e.g., due to information asymmetries – among a highly dispersed 
creditor community. And concerning the latter alternative, the enforcement of a judgment 
against a defaulted sovereign debtor has been successful only in a very limited number of cases 
                                                 
6 Alternatively, the debtor could call for a bondholder meeting and ask its creditors to vote on a change of the 
financial terms of the bond. For a more detailed analysis of these different restructuring procedures see chapter IV. 
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in the past.7 Therefore, it is difficult for the single bondholder to evaluate the obtainment in 
case of rejection which has an impact on its decision whether to accept or to reject. 
But the uncertainty over the success of litigation against a sovereign debtor in default is 
somehow necessary to prevent distortionary incentives threatening the success of the debt 
restructuring. If litigation and especially its enforcement against the debtor would never be 
successful then creditors would lose an important threat against the delinquent debtor. The 
incentive for the debtor to reach an agreement – hence its willingness to repay – would be 
solely liable to reputation effects, e.g., its ability to receive external financing at affordable 
interest rates in the future.8 But this would limit the possible amount of such collateralized debt 
to much tighter limits than today’s debt levels. If, on the contrary, litigation will always 
guarantee the total fulfillment of all contractual obligations the creditors would face severe 
free-riding incentives. As long as the other creditors accepted the restructuring terms, thereby 
bringing the debtor back to solvency, the single bondholder could benefit by rejecting the 
exchange-offer while seeking legal enforcement. Therefore any institutionalized restructuring 
mechanism exhibits a trade-off between acknowledging the contractual entitlement resulting 
from the bond and the limitation of free-riding incentives threatening the necessary burden-
sharing among creditors. This trade-off is reflected in the choice of a specific (potentially 
majority-) voting procedure which has a substantial impact on the effectiveness of creditor 
coordination. 
                                                 
7 See Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer (2006: 72-73) for a list of successful litigation cases since the 1990s. 
8 In this context the seminal contribution of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) on reputation effects and, consequently, 
the question of why private creditor are willing to lend to a sovereign debtor provoked an intense debate in the 
literature with still puzzling features. For a survey on this issue and arguments in favor of the occurrence of default 
in equilibrium see Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer (2006: 31-36) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006). 
I. Introduction 
 16
I.3. Creditor Coordination in Recent Cases of Debt Exchange-Offers 
The history of creditor coordination among bondholders against a sovereign debtor dates back 
to the first heyday of the bond market in the penultimate century. Comparable to the 
restructurings over the last decade, most negotiations between the 1820s and the 1870s 
involved ad hoc creditor committees achieving only a poor performance from a creditor’s point 
of view. The reasons were a lack of specialization and experience as well as heterogeneity 
among creditors which lead to a weak coordination and sometimes even competing creditor 
committees. This changed with the establishment of an institutionalized and thereby permanent 
creditor representation body in 1868, the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (CFB), which 
was able to significantly increase the effectiveness of creditor coordination. This success, 
however, was not achieved until a reconstitution through an act of parliament in 1898 that 
replaced a somehow biased - in favor of only some creditor groups - through a more balanced 
membership to represent all different groups of bondholders. The CFB had two main functions: 
First, to provide information about debtor countries to the bondholders and, second, to 
negotiate settlements with debtors and coordinate the different groups of bondholders. But the 
corporation did not have the legal authority to accept any restructuring terms. The negotiated 
restructuring agreement would only become valid after the CFB had asked the bondholders to 
vote on it.  
When international lending returned in the form of syndicated lending by commercial banks 
private creditor representation had to be adapted. The decisive difference was that in the 1970s 
and 1980s debtor countries experienced times of financial distress it was not a widely dispersed 
community of individual bondholders but a few creditor banks that had to be coordinated on 
reaching a restructuring agreement to bring the debtor back to a sustainable debt level. 
Therefore ad hoc “Bank Advisory Committees” (BAC) were created usually under the 
leadership of the bank with the largest credit exposure against the debtor country concerned. 
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This process – also referred to as the “London Club Approach” – was somehow similar to the 
mode of operation of the CFB as a representation body negotiated with the debtor but 
acceptance of the restructuring terms was taken by each creditor individually.9 Moreover, a 
relatively small and transparent creditor community allowed for some moral and economic 
arm-twisting of banks that tried to elude their contribution in the burden-sharing which limited 
free-riding incentives. As commercial bank loans are still a source of external financing for 
emerging markets BACs still play a role in today’s restructurings but most debt crises and 
restructurings between 1998 and 2005 focused on sovereign bonds held by a heterogeneous 
group of creditors which were mostly non-banks.  
Starting with the debt crises in Russia there were eight relevant bond exchanges since the 
Brady-Plan initiated a renaissance of this segment of the bond market. These cases can be 
categorized to three pre-default restructurings (without missed payments prior to the 
restructuring) in Pakistan (1999), Uruguay (2003) and the Dominican Republic (2005) and five 
post default restructurings in Russia (1998-2000), the Ukraine (1998-2000), Ecuador (1999-
2000), Moldova (2002) and Argentina (2001-2005).10 Although all these cases exhibit a certain 
degree of idiosyncrasy there are some common elements that summarize the experience made. 
First, although participation rates in the exchange-offers varied between hundred percent 
(Moldova) and 76 percent (Argentina) with a different treatment of holdouts, participation 
seems to be negatively correlated with the number and dissimilarity of the investor base. 
Second, in most cases there were no formal negotiations between the debtor and a creditor 
committee as the ad hoc bondholder representation bodies were only of minor relevance for the 
                                                 
9 The London Club should not be confused with the Paris Club, the machinery for restructuring official sector 
sovereign debt. In contrast to the London Club, the Paris Club is a well documented institution with a secretary 
located at the Banque de France. 
10 A summary of the details of the restructuring can be found in chapter V. 
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outcome of the restructuring process. And third, the smaller the number of creditors involved in 
the process, the better the communication and hence negotiation between the debtor country 
and its bondholders. These findings suggest that the coordination among creditors is affected 
by the number and heterogeneity of different types of creditors. 
I.4. The International Financial Architecture and the Contractual Approach 
Ever since the official sector – especially the International Monetary Fund – tackled the 
financial crises in Mexico (1994) and in a number of East Asian countries (1997) with large 
rescue packages containing public sector money, this conveyed the impression that private 
creditors would be bailed out in times of trouble. Hence, a discussion started on the topic of 
how to involve the private sector – and thereby primarily private bondholders – in the burden-
sharing of the costs of resolving financial crises in emerging markets. The design of an 
institutionalized restructuring process for emerging market bonds represents an important part 
of this debate on the details of an international financial architecture.  
Summary of Debt Restructuring Mechanisms 
Debtors IMF
Multilateral 
development 
banks
Bilateral 
agencies
Commercial 
Banks Bond Investors Suppliers
Sovereigns
Public sector 
enterprises
No such debt 
exists
Banks
No such debt 
exists
No such debt 
exists
Special 
treatment
No such debt 
exists
Private 
companies
No such debt 
exists
Creditors
Preffential treatment
National corporate bankruptcy regime
Special 
treatment
Paris Club London Club Contractual 
Approach 
(some aspects 
still to be 
determined)
Ad hoc
Source: in reference to Rieffel (2003: 21) 
 
Large parts of this discussion were about two competing proposals for such a process which 
were labeled statutory and contractual. While the latter one represented only minor changes of 
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the status-quo by the amendment of clauses in bond contracts specifying the voting procedure 
in combination with a code of conduct binding debtor and creditor on a voluntary basis, the 
statutory proposal implied larger changes by aiming at the establishment of an international 
bankruptcy law. Comparable to the U.S. corporate bankruptcy law should the debtor and its 
creditors subordinate to a legally codified restructuring process. After years of intensive dispute 
it is the contractual approach that is currently prevailing, albeit some aspects still need to be 
determined.11 
Although both proposals exhibited substantial differences the common element was the goal to 
create permanent machinery for the restructuring of emerging market bonds that helps to make 
the restructuring process both more effective and predictable and thereby reduces the costs of 
financial crises resolution. Defending the restructuring process against intra-creditor 
coordination failures plays a crucial role in achieving this goal as a limited coordination among 
creditors can have a significant influence on the result of the negotiations and can lead to a 
welfare loss caused by inefficient bargaining. Hence, although not fully formed yet the 
currently prevailing contractual approach to sovereign debt restructuring needs constant review 
of its ability to foster the coordination among bondholders.  
I.5. Three Papers on Intra-creditor Coordination Failures 
This work comprises three essays that try to contribute to the task of reviewing the contractual 
approach for sovereign debt restructuring especially focusing on aspects of intra-creditor 
coordination. Although the content of these essays is interconnected, each unit is supposed to 
represent a stand-alone entity. Therefore, the work lacks bridge passages between the chapters 
                                                 
11 A more detailed analysis of this debate and the open aspects can be found in chapter IV. 
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and exhibits introductory chapters containing replicating descriptions of the restructuring 
process. This, however, enables an unhinged and independent reading of each of the three 
chapters (essays). 
The first essay analyses the experiences drawn from the largest and most complicated 
restructuring process of sovereign bonds after the Brady-Plan in Argentina which lead to an 
exchange-offer in January 2005 containing a haircut of about two-thirds. It highlights the 
potential coordination failures among bondholders in simultaneous decision-making and in 
how far these failures can be exploited for the benefit of the debtor. The second essay hints at 
the one-sided distribution of bargaining power in an exchange-offer and the consequences 
social preferences can play in determining heterogeneous creditor behavior. Starting from the 
heterogeneity among creditors the third essay describes the current status of the contractual 
approach and the resulting possibility for the debtor to benefit from inter-temporally 
discriminating between different creditors. This essay concludes with a proposal for a creation 
of a creditor representation body which exhibits a similar mode of operation as the CFB in the 
penultimate century.  
Summarizing the conclusions drawn from these essays the contractual approach is not yet able 
to guarantee effective creditor coordination due to a lack of a comprehensive and forceful 
permanent creditor representation. Establishing such a permanent representational body would 
replicate the institutional development experienced during the last heydays of bonds as a source 
of emerging market financing which lead to a significant improvement in creditor coordination. 
And since the result of a potential debt restructuring draws back to the ex-ante lending decision 
by the individual investor this improvement could contribute to the welfare-enhancing effects 
of external financing for developing economies, Wright (2005). 
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II. Assurance Game in Argentinean Debt Restructuring12 
II.1. Introduction 
On March 3rd 2005 the Argentinean government announced the success of its restructuring 
process, including the harshest haircut private creditors on the international bond markets have 
ever agreed on.13 Creditors holding about 76% of the debt volume of USD 103 billion accepted 
the offer for a debt swap, including a major reduction in the present value of the exchanged 
Argentinean bonds. Hitherto, this substantial reduction in debt service payments enabled the 
country to enjoy a strong economic growth over the last years, thereby reversing the negative 
economic effects of the currency and debt crises that led to default in December 2001. But this 
successful resolution of the Argentinean debt crises came at a high price in terms of face value 
to creditors who accepted. These creditors lost about 70% of their bonds´ nominal values, and 
creditors that did not tender their bonds were left with an unknown future. The so-called 
holdouts were mostly European Retail Investors who are now irritated about what to do with 
their apparently worthless bonds. The best they can hope for is that Argentina opens for a 
second time a window for its exchange-offer to tender their bonds.  
This restructuring did not only set a new all-time record line in terms of debt reduction but it 
was also the first time the restructuring of a modern debt crises of a major emerging market 
debtor since the early 1990s was completely handed over to the financial markets. In this 
process neither the IMF nor any other multinational political institution was willing to either 
                                                 
12 The content of this chapter is drawn largely from Engelen and Graf Lambsdorff (2005). The term Assurance-
game is generic name for what is more commonly known as a Stag-hunt game. 
13 See chapter V for comparable debt exchange since the Brady-Plan.  
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coordinate or finance the resolution mechanism. This case provides a new benchmark for future 
debt restructurings, with repercussions on the design of the international financial architecture.  
The process of sovereign debt restructuring substantially changed over the last two decades due 
to a major shift in the capital flows to the emerging markets from banking loans towards the 
international bond markets. In most modern debt crises the debtor does not negotiate with the 
creditors or a representation body but unilaterally offers a bond exchange including a haircut on 
the amount owed. Creditors then uncoordinatedly decide on accepting or rejecting the offer. 
Most theoretical work on this topic highlights the threat of coordination failures between the 
debtor and creditors due to strategic behavior of both parties caused by asymmetric information 
(Haldane et al. 2005). However, among creditors there also might appear coordination failures 
due to an increasingly diverse and diffuse creditor base that could induce a minority of 
creditors to free-ride on the debt reduction effort of the majority (Krueger 2001), as well as 
difficulties in the aggregation and representation of different claims (Bartholomew et al. 2004). 
Several approaches to mitigate these coordination problems have been made and were lately 
intensively discussed (Roubini and Setser 2004; Rieffel 2003). These approaches vary from 
pure market based suggestions to rather statutory concepts. But despite the intense discussions 
on the new design of financial architecture and progress in the inclusion of Collective Action 
Clauses in new bond issues, as well as the determination of a common Code of Conduct, these 
elements had only a minor impact on the Argentinean debt restructuring.14 First, most of the 
                                                 
14 Collective Action Clauses (CACs) determine a common decision-making process by bondholders. The most 
popular among these clauses are the majority clauses that allow a qualified majority of bondholders to bind in a 
ruffling minority in a debt restructuring process, thereby limiting the vetoing power of each individual bondholder. 
In most cases (e.g., bonds under UK law), an acceptance of 75% of the overall debt amount is sufficient to change 
the financial terms (principal, interest payments, and maturity) of a bond. However, bonds that were issued under 
U.S. law do not consist of majority voting clauses with respect to the financial terms of the bond. 
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defaulted bonds were issued under New York Law without Collective Actions Clauses; second, 
Argentina was the only Emerging Market country not willing to sign the voluntary Code of 
Conduct, arguing that it would negatively influence its restructuring effort.  
However, after the experiences of restructuring efforts in Ecuador (year 1999-2000) and 
Uruguay (year 2003), some academics suggested using Exit Consents as a substitute for 
Collective Action Clauses as long as these clauses were not yet integrated in most of the 
Emerging Market bonds currently issued (Chamberlin 2001).15 These, mostly law, academics 
argue that such consents offer the opportunity to bind in a holdout minority of bondholders by 
threatening to change the non-financial terms of the restructured bond, which could impose a 
loss to the holdouts. This threat should deter so-called vulture investors from buying distressed 
debt at a discount from the secondary market in order to extort a debtor by disruptively vetoing 
the restructuring process. In their opinion, the effects of Exit Consents should equal those of 
Collective Action Clauses. As it is argued in this paper, the effects of the two contractual 
instruments to bind these holdouts are dramatically different, with Exit Consents clearly 
favoring the debtor. This is one effect that led to the high haircuts in Argentina. 
This essay aims to analyze the coordination among creditors and how this process can be 
influenced by certain features of the exchange-offer. Therefore, it is necessary to present the 
exchange-offer made by the Argentinean government to the creditors (section II.2.). Based on 
                                                 
15 The first time Exit Consents (ECs) became publicly known as a restructuring tool in modern financial crises was 
in the exchange of Ecuador’s bonds in 2000. Every bondholder that accepted the offer was required to vote in 
favor of a long list of amendments to provisions in the original bond documentation. Since even under New York 
law a qualified majority is sufficient to change the non-financial terms of a certain bond, Ecuador used these Exit 
Consents to reduce the rights of the remaining bondholders by eliminating certain covenants (e.g., listing at the 
Luxembourg Stock Exchange). This reduced the attractiveness of the old bond, forcing bondholders to accept the 
exchange-offer (Salmon and Gallardo 2001). 
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this exchange-offer it describes the resulting stag-hunt game for creditors (section II.3.) and 
models the decentralized decision making process (section II.4.). Then, the model is extended 
to demonstrate how a most favored creditor clause increases the coordination problems and 
therefore benefits the debtor (section II.5.). Additionally, it is shown how a sovereign debtor 
could be tempted to influence the expected acceptance of the exchange-offer by specially 
tailored bonus payments (section II.6.). Conclusively, the analysis draws attention to the 
differences in the effects of Collective Action Clauses and Exit Consents (section II.7.). 
II.2. The Exchange-offer  
After experiencing serious macroeconomic instabilities, Argentina defaulted on USD 61.8 
billion in public bonds and USD 8 billion in other liabilities on the 24th December 2001.16 Until 
the final debt swap offer was launched in January 2005 this amount had increased to a total 
sum of USD 102.6 billion, including the past due interest payments on the defaulted debt. Two 
Argentinean proposals for a debt swap with haircuts between 70%-80%, the “Dubai Proposal”, 
and the “Buenos Aires Proposal” were strongly rejected by the market participants. This 
changed in late 2004 because of increasing market liquidity and falling spreads on emerging 
market bonds, which lead to higher present values for the offered debt swaps.17 This 
development paved the way for Argentina to launch the third swap offer with only few changes 
to the previous swap. In addition, ambitious marketing by the government pressured the 
creditors to accept. The swap started on January 14th 2005 and closed six weeks later. Creditors 
                                                 
16 For a survey of Argentinean debt history and the current restructuring process see Damill et al. (2005) and 
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006: 165-201). 
17 To value emerging market bonds, future interest and principal payments are discounted by current interest rates 
in addition to a risk premium for a certain debtor. Therefore, falling interest rates (lower risk-free rates as well as 
tightening spreads) on the global debt markets reduce these discount rates, thereby increasing the present value of 
any future payment. This makes an exchange-offer look more attractive due to a higher present value. 
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of defaulted debt had the opportunity to tender eligible securities in exchange for any of the 
three following new securities: 
(i) par bonds18 due in December 2038 with attached GDP-linked securities;19 
 
(ii) discount bonds20 due in December 2033 with attached GDP-linked 
securities; and 
 
(iii) quasi-par bonds21 due in December 2045 with attached GDP-linked 
securities. 
The par bonds were the most popular of these newly offered securities among creditors.22 
Therefore, the details in terms of total volume and the allocation for this specific bond type 
were an important element of the exchange-offer. Regarding the total volume, Argentina had 
set a benchmark level of a 70% acceptance rate. Should the offer bring a rate above that level, 
the country would offer a volume of par bonds of USD 15 billion, and only USD 10 billion if 
the acceptance was below. Further, Argentina divided the submission period into two periods 
for purposes of allocation of pars: an early-tender period, comprising the first three weeks of 
the submission period, and a late-tender period, comprising the remainder of the submission 
                                                 
18 The offered par bond carried the same amount of principle as the old bonds tendered for it, but with a longer 
maturity and substantially lower coupon payments. 
19 Each bond in the exchange-offer consists of an attached GDP-linked security – comparable to a warrant - that 
guarantees additional payments in the case that Argentina should achieve GDP continuous growth rates of more 
than 3%. 
20 Discount bonds had a discount of 66.3% on its principal but carried a higher coupon payment and shorter 
maturity than the par bonds. 
21 Quasi-par bonds had a discount on the principal of about 30% and the coupon payments were between the par 
and the discount bonds. The quasi-pars mainly addressed institutional investors. 
22 In debt restructuring processes different groups of creditors have different preferences and want different 
restructuring terms. Banks and retail investors prefer a preservation of the face value, whereas institutional 
investors focus on the market value of the newly offered securities (Roubini and Setser, 2004: 258).  
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period. Bondholders that tendered during the early-tender period would have priority in the 
allocation of pars. 
II.3. The Stag-hunt Game  
After the Argentinean exchange-offer was launched each creditor had six weeks to decide 
whether to accept or to reject it. Acceptance yields the market value of the newly issued bond. 
Rejection may entail suing Argentina for fulfillment of its contractual liabilities. However, 
debtor sovereignty limits any judicial enforcement so that the success of such a “going-to-
court” alternative is less a matter of legal ruling and more a matter of political pressure.23 This 
becomes especially clear in the case of Argentina: although some investors – mostly vulture 
funds – still try to find ground for legal “guerrilla tactics”, the majority of the holdout creditors 
are retail investors hoping for a political solution for all creditors, hence not a minority trying 
to gain at the expense of the majority (“Bond Holdouts gain no ground from Argentina”, Wall 
Street Journal, 11th July 2005, Pg. C1).  
A crucial question for debt restructuring concerns the criteria for success or failure of an 
exchange-offer. An offer is regarded to be successful when international capital starts flowing 
again. Therefore, the market perspective for minimum participation before granting fresh 
capital is crucial in this context. Should the debtor with its exchange-offer not reach this 
benchmark then the offer is regarded as a failure and Argentina gets under strong pressure to 
launch an improved offer. Although all official institutions – especially the IMF – refused to set 
such a benchmark, there were some statements from market participants about a minimum 
                                                 
23 For details in enforcing debt contracts against a sovereign borrower see Häusler et al. (2003). 
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requirement for the participation rate of at least 70% (Deutsche Bank 2005).24  
Interestingly, this wobbliness over a necessary minimum participation was hindering a 
consistent coordination process among creditors. Without knowing what percentage of debt is 
necessary to veto the offered repayment terms, creditors could not clearly distinguish their 
alternative options. A second reason complicating the coordination process was that the 
creditor side consisted of different creditor groups with different perspectives on the offer. 
Only two days after the offer was announced, Argentinean pension funds, holding 17% of the 
debt, issued a statement that they had already tendered, as they had agreed with the government 
months ago.25 Other Argentinean bondholders were likely to follow this example. Soon after 
this statement large foreign institutional investors also signaled their willingness to tender. On 
the other side the Global Committee of Argentine Bondholders (GCAB) – an umbrella 
representation body of the private retail creditors – recommended to its members that they 
reject the offer since the amount of the haircut would be economically unjustified. GCAB was 
convinced that Argentina – after having experienced a substantial improvement in its economy 
in the aftermath of the default – could pay much more than the roughly 30 cents on the dollar 
offered (GCAB 2005).26  
Some observers stated that in the last weeks of the tender period it was mainly the group of 
                                                 
24 For a critical view on the role of the IMF in the Argentinean debt restructuring process, see Salmon (2004b). 
25 It is presumed that the Argentinean government coaxed the domestic pension funds to accept the offer before 
the tender period by granting regulatory benefits (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 2005: 40). 
26 Roubini (2005) strongly criticizes the representation bodies for this advice since, in his opinion, it was mainly 
self-serving. In his view, banks and financial institutions had ripped-off small savers by dumping their 
Argentinean bonds on them and in order to not be sued for their ill-advice they are now paying for the 
representation of these investors. Therefore, the representation had to reject the offer as a signal to the retail 
creditors that the bonds represent a higher value so that the banks are not accusable of having recommended 
buying worthless bonds.  
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foreign retail creditors that were reluctant to accept the offer (Gelpern 2005).27 Taking the 
numbers of the GCAB, retail investors represented about 50% of the total amount of defaulted 
debt eligible to the exchange-offer.28 If all retail creditors rejected the offer, it was highly 
possible that Argentina could not reach even the self-stated minimum participation of 50% and 
that the whole creditor community could count on an improved offer. Conversely, there was the 
threat that if half of these retail investors accepted, a participation of just over 70% would be 
reached and the exchange-offer would be regarded as successful. This would extremely reduce 
the value of the remaining bonds as it would enable Argentina to delist the defaulted securities, 
thereby “closing” the secondary market for these bonds (Deutsche Bank 2005). In the end, this 
is what happened; apparently some of the retail investors accepted the offer.29 This triggered 
other investors to follow and in the end – about two hours before the deadline to tender – even 
the strongly opposing retail bondholder representation, the Argentine Bond Restructuring 
Agency, accepted the exchange-offer. Its chief negotiator, Adam Lerrick, told the Financial 
Times, “that the high level of participation among other bondholders clinched its decision to 
agree.” (Financial Times, 28th February 2005) 
II.4. Coordination in a Stag-hunt Game  
Resulting from the structure of the restructuring process the private creditors were stuck in a 
situation comparable to a stag-hunt game.30 The decision making process is simplified by 
                                                 
27 See Salmon (2004a) for arguments why retail investors will always be the most reluctant to accept an exchange-
offer in a sovereign debt restructuring. 
28 GCAB (2004) shows that about USD 49 billion (60.5%) of the total USD 81 billion are held by retail investors. 
By the last presentation in January 2005 this figure decreased to USD 37.9 billion (46.8%) (GCAB 2005). 
29 The majority of these investors accepted the offer by selling their bonds to secondary markets (Deutsche Bank 
2005). 
30 The aspect referred to is the coordination game among creditors. As this sub-game can be interpreted as part of a 
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assuming only two investors, each holding (for example) 25% of the bonds, to decide on the 
exchange-offer.31 Another 50% have already accepted the offer. The exchange-offer would be 
regarded successful if one player accepts, bringing the acceptance rate to 75%. The payoff to 
the investors would then be depicted by the following matrix: 
accept reject
ω Ω-L
accept
ω ω
ω Ω-qL
reject
Ω-L Ω-qL
Player II
Pl
ay
er
 I
 
Each investor makes a decision whether to accept the offer, ω, or to reject it. The lower left 
(upper right) term describes the payoff to Player I (II). Acceptance immediately results in a 
payoff of ω. If an investor rejects the offer he tries to increase political pressure on the country 
for an improvement of the existing offer. The result is an expected amendment of the 
exchange-offer whose total monetary equivalent, including the primary exchange-offer, is 
denoted by Ω, (Ω > ω).32  
                                                                                                                                                           
larger zero-sum restructuring game played by the debtor and the whole creditor community we disregard aspects 
of welfare analysis. That creditor coordination can result in a stag-hunt game has already been shown by Ghosal 
and Miller (2003). These authors analyze the coordination failures in the context of a rollover-decision by 
creditors triggering a liquidity shortage. 
31 A demonstration that the results of the 2x2 game are also valid with n-creditors (n>2) can be found in the 
Appendix.  
32 The condition Ω > ω indicates that the debtor country’s ability to pay is higher than her willingness. This 
assumption is consistent with most of the academic literature on this topic (Haldane et al. 2002; and Goshal and 
Miller 2003). In these models the underlying rationale relates to a moral hazard situation regarding the debtor’s 
incentives for compliance. A debtor only puts maximum costly effort into increasing her economic performance 
during the aftermath of a crisis if she at least partially benefits from the proceeds. In contrast, in the model 
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This political path bears direct costs for legal action and political campaigning, denoted by L, 
(L>0), which are largely fixed. If both investors reject the offer they both get the potential 
increase of the new exchange-offer but share the costs. In the two-player game situation this 
would be indicated by q=0.5. Finding political support may actually become easier the more 
players are involved, suggesting that q might even be smaller than 0.5.33 A value for 
q=0.25<0.5 thus denotes economies of scale in organizing political campaigns, that is, gains 
from coordination in the game outlined.  
We assume that the fixed amount of legal cost against a sovereign country is larger than the 
potential gain from an increased offer (L>(Ω-ω)), but the expected value is lower when many 
creditors reject (qL<(Ω-ω)). Assuming perfect information, it is preferable for Player I to 
accept when Player II accepts and to reject when Player II rejects. There are two Nash 
equilibria in pure strategies and an additional equilibrium in mixed strategies. Let a1 
(respectively b1) denote the probability for Player I (II) to accept.34 A mixed strategy requires 
that Player I and Player II are indifferent between rejecting and accepting, so that they may 
render their decision to a random mechanism. This indifference for Player I is given when b1 ω 
+ b2 ω = b1(Ω-L) + b2(Ω-qL) Ù  
b1* =
Ω ω−
L
q−
1 q−( ) . 
                                                                                                                                                           
presented the difference arises due to the costs of political campaigning. Therefore one can interpret Ω as the 
highest payment still leaving ample incentives to the debtor to pursue costly effort for an economic recovery.  
33 Haldane et al. (2005) also show a theoretical analysis of the decision process in the case of New York Law 
bonds. However, in their model the legal costs are independent of the overall acceptance rate. This is the main 
difference between their and the current analysis since the latter one tries to endogenize the political pressure on 
the debtor country if a large enough fraction of debtors reject the offer. 
34 Hence a2 (b2) denotes the probability to reject, b1 = 1-b2. 
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The mixed strategy equilibrium can also be interpreted as the watershed, suggesting which pure 
strategy to prefer when being uncertain about the other player’s behavior. In this perspective 
the finding is more intuitive. With an increasing (Ω-ω), that is, higher gains from rejection, b1* 
increases, suggesting that for Player I to accept he requires a higher prior probability of Player 
II to accept also. Likewise, b1* decreases in L, the costs of mobilizing political pressure. This 
implies that Player I would prefer to accept, unless there is a high prior likelihood for Player II 
to reject. Take the following values as an example: ω = 100, Ω = 125, L = 50, q = 0.25 
 
accept reject
100 75
accept
100 100
100 112.5
reject
75 112.5
Player II
Pl
ay
er
 I
 
In this example b1 = 1/3.  
Given the multiple equilibria, which will actually be played? One approach for finding a 
unique solution would be to focus on pure strategies (that is, to disregard the mixed 
equilibrium) and use risk dominance as the criterion employed by the players in deciding which 
of the two pure equilibria to prefer, (Harsanyi and Selten 1988).35 The concept of risk 
dominance recommends selecting the equilibrium containing the highest product measured by 
the deviation payoffs. A deviation payoff is the loss one player must bear if he does not choose 
                                                 
35 Risk-dominance competes with different selection concepts. But it tends to be the most popular concept for 
equilibrium selection, justifying the current focus on this criterion. For an overview see Carlsson and van Damme 
(1993). 
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the best reply against his opponent’s action. The intuition is that the players try to minimize the 
risk of losses. 36 
Applied to the current context, there is no risk involved if player I accepts; irrespective of 
player II’s choice the payoff is ω. Conversely, joint rejection provides a higher payoff. But this 
choice is risky for player I if player II accepts. The risk dominance concept compares these 
risks and opportunities for players I and II jointly by determining a Nash-product of deviation-
payoffs for each Nash equilibrium. When both accept (payoff 100) each player avoids the 
lower payoff obtained when rejecting alone (payoff 75). But when rejecting (payoff 112.5), 
each player increases the income compared to acceptance. In general terms, the deviation-
payoff product when both accept (payoff ω) is the product of the difference obtained for player 
I choosing to reject (payoff Ω-L) multiplied with the same difference for player II due to 
symmetry: (ω-(Ω-L))(ω-(Ω-L)). This value depicts the avoided risk when choosing acceptance. 
The deviation-payoff product, in case of rejection (payoff Ω-qL), would be the product of the 
difference obtained for player I when accepting (payoff ω) multiplied with the same term for 
player II due to symmetry: (Ω-qL-ω)(Ω-qL-ω). This term depicts the potential increase in 
income resulting from rejection.  
Accepting the exchange-offer would be risk dominant if both player’s deviation-payoff product 
(ω-(Ω-L))(ω-(Ω-L)) were larger than that in the case of rejection, (Ω-qL-ω)(Ω-qL-ω). 
Rearranging yields that accept risk is preferred if  
(1) ω > Ω - (1+q)L/2 ;  
                                                 
36 The concept of risk dominance might not be pareto-optimal as it may conflict with the payoff-dominant 
equilibrium that both creditors reject (Harsanyi and Selten 1988: 88-90). See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991: 20-23) 
for the role of pre-play communication and trust in the selection process when payoff-dominance and risk-
dominance conflict. 
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that is, if gains from rejection are small, legal costs are high, and gains from collective action 
are limited such that q is large. In the numerical example, acceptance would be risk dominant if  
ω > 125 - (1+0.25).50/2 = 93.75. 
Increases in legal costs, L, and reduced gains from coordination (increasing q), would provide 
the debtor with slack according to equation (1). This would allow for a reduced exchange-offer, 
ω.  
The debtor country profits from the strategic uncertainty among the creditors. If these were 
instead able to coordinate their actions, they could determine the pure Nash-equilibrium that 
provides them with the highest payoff. An exchange-offer would only be accepted if ω>Ω-qL. 
Hence, the debtor benefits from individual creditor’s fears that other creditors may accept, thus 
lowering his chances of a successful political campaign. This in turn makes acceptance 
preferable even where collective action among creditors would allow squeezing out higher 
payoffs. In the example, collectively choosing to accept would be the dominant strategy only if 
ω>125-0.25.50 = 112.5. So by the stag-hunt game the debtor gets additional slack for a reduced 
offer of 112.5-93.75 = 18.75. 
It is noteworthy that as, apart from the legal costs, all payments arise in the future the sovereign 
debtor might fail to fully commit to these payments. However, as this uncertainty due to 
commitment problems would concern all future payments equally, the structure of the game 
outlined and the resulting coordination failures among creditors are not affected. The only 
exception to this is the case of a most favored creditor clause, where – as will be shown – the 
degree of commitment is a decisive element for its effect on creditor coordination. 
II.5. Effects of a Most Favored Creditor Clause (MFC) 
A most favored creditor clause provides another opportunity to the debtor to exploit the 
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creditors. Such a clause ensures creditors who accept the offer in the first place to participate in 
any later improvement of the offer presented to creditors that initially did not accept the offer. 
In the case of Argentina the inclusion of these clauses was controversially discussed. Most 
legal comments on the exchange-offer pointed out that the clause was not waterproof.37 Thus, 
the probability (as expected by creditors) that Argentina will share any improvements with 
those who already accepted is depicted by p<1. Assuming risk neutrality, the payoff from 
acceptance while others reject increases by p(Ω-ω). Considering this we get the following 
extension of the game situation: 
accept reject
ω Ω-L
accept
ω ω+p(Ω-ω)
ω+p(Ω-ω) Ω-qL
reject
Ω-L Ω-qL
Player II
Pl
ay
er
 I
 
A trivial situation with dominance of acceptance is obtained if ω+p(Ω-ω) > Ω-qL Ù 1-qL/(Ω-
ω) < p*. This implies that for acceptance to be preferred p*<1 would already suffice. A debtor 
country does not have to integrate a waterproof most favored creditor clause in its offer. There 
is a certain probability (p*) below unity that is sufficient to make acceptance the only Nash 
equilibrium. Any further increase of p above that necessary level (p*) would potentially bear 
additional costs without any benefit for the debtor country since accepting is already the 
                                                 
37 This clause, for example, refers to the Republic of Argentina but not to the institutions it controls; e.g., the 
Banco Nacion. These institutions can negotiate with holdout creditors and buy back old securities at a higher price 
on the secondary market. Such a purchase would not be covered by the MFC, providing a loophole for the 
Argentinean government to circumvent the MFC (DekaBank 2005).  
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dominant strategy.38 Assuming p < 1-qL/(Ω-ω), again two pure Nash-equilibria and one Nash-
equilibrium in mixed strategies are obtained. Focusing on the question of which pure Nash 
equilibrium is to be preferred, the risk dominance concept implies that acceptance is preferred 
if (ω-(Ω-L))(ω-(Ω-L)) > (Ω-qL-ω- p(Ω-ω))(Ω-qL-ω-p(Ω-ω)). Simplification yields: 
(2) ω > Ω - (1+q)L/(2-p). 
 
Equation (2) shows that the higher the probability for the MFC to hold (p), the lower a debtor 
country can set the exchange-offer and still keep accepting preferable. In equilibrium there are 
no actual costs involved for Argentina in arranging a MFC, because joint acceptance is the 
equilibrium played. Thus, a MFC is clearly a method in favor of the debtor.  
II.6. Effects of a Bonus Payment 
Another way of altering the necessary minimum offer would be a bonus payment – called a 
sweetener - given to creditors if a certain participation level is reached. In the two-player game, 
such a payment (γ) is made when both players accept: 
                                                 
38 In a situation of a sovereign debt restructuring there tend to be vulture creditors, specialized in legal processes 
against countries that have reached a restructuring agreement with the majority of its creditors. In some of these 
cases debtor countries lost the fight against these rogue creditors and cashed them out (e.g., Peru vs. Elliott 
Associates, Mandeng 2004). Since the so-called Collective Action Clauses, which aim to bind in these holdout-
creditors, were not yet included in the bonds eligible to the Argentinean debt swap offer, the country still faces the 
threat of legal action from remaining creditors. A probability for the effectiveness of the MFC (p) below unity 
enables the debtor to cash out these creditors in case of a legal defeat without having to improve the terms for all 
other creditors. Hence, reducing this ability by increasing the probability (p) can be interpreted as costs to the 
debtor. For a more detailed discussion of the MFC in the Argentinean bonds see Gelpern (2005). 
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accept reject
ω+γ Ω-L
accept
ω+γ ω
ω Ω-qL
reject
Ω-L Ω-qL
Player II
Pl
ay
er
 I
 
We obtain the usual two Nash equilibria in pure and one in mixed strategies. Acceptance is risk 
preferred if  
(3) ω > Ω - [γ+(1+q)L]/2. 
A bonus payment γ would thus allow a reduction in the offer by γ/2 while still preserving 
acceptance as the risk dominant strategy. However, this time this advantage is more than offset 
by the costs involved in paying the bonus, because this payment is precisely made in the 
selected Nash equilibrium. The advantage of γ/2 is thus more than offset by the costs γ. 
In the Argentinean exchange-offer the par bonds were the most favored bond type among 
creditors. Therefore, enlarging the amount of issued par bonds once a participation of over 70% 
is reached can be interpreted as a bonus payment for accepting. But the total amount of par 
bonds was limited to USD 15 billion and the amount each individual creditor could tender was 
USD 50,000. However, this bonus payment is different to the general bonus payment described 
above. The main difference is that the value of this bonus payment for each accepting creditor 
is, by itself, contingent on how the other creditors decide. Once the necessary benchmark 
acceptance of 70% is reached the amount of par bonds increases by a certain amount (USD 5 
billion) independent of whether 71% or 99% of the creditors accepted the offer. The only effect 
of a further increase above the benchmark level is that the share of the bonus payment for the 
single accepting bondholder diminishes. The higher the overall participation is the less likely it 
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is that the individual creditor will receive the amount of par bonds he was entitled to tender 
for.39  
Let a debtor country offer such a contingent bonus payment (z) to the creditors, like the 
additional par bonds in the case of Argentina. In this game each single bondholder would 
receive z if he accepts while his opponent rejects and just z/2 if both accept since each gets a 
minor share. The game would be the following: 
accept reject
ω+z/2 Ω-L
accept
ω+z/2 ω+z
ω+z Ω-qL
reject
Ω-L Ω-qL
Player II
Pl
ay
er
 I
 
Then the country could set its offer according to  
(4) ω > Ω -(1+q)L/2-3/4z. 
This demonstrates that the debtor can lower her costs of the exchange-offer by 3/4z compared 
to additional payments in equilibrium of z/2. An even stronger effect could be achieved if a 
bonus is paid to the creditor contingent on the rejection of the other creditor. Hence, such 
contingent bonus payments are an advantageous tool for an exchange-offer, and possibly 
stronger if used in future debt exchange-offers. 
                                                 
39 Under the assumption that the amount of par bonds each creditor receives in the allocation is the minimum of 
his pro rata share and the tender limit of USD 50,000. 
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II.7. Differences between Collective Action Clauses and Exit Consents 
Applying the above developed framework the crucial difference between the effects of 
Collective Action Clauses (CACs) and Exit Consents (ECs) can be shown. These two 
instruments – contrary to their recognition in the literature (Buchheit and Gulati 2000; Choi and 
Gulati 2003) – have substantially different effects on the decision process of the individual 
creditor in a debt exchange-offer.  
Majority voting clauses are the crucial element of the Collective Action Clauses that become 
increasingly popular in order to mitigate holdout behavior, a behavior that is sometimes 
exploited by vulture funds (IMF 2005). Although Argentinean bonds under New York law did 
not include these clauses it is interesting to see how the rejecting creditors could have 
benefited. In contrast to a bond exchange, these clauses allow a qualified majority via a bond 
amendment to restructure the debt by changing the financial terms of the bonds which are then 
effectual to all bonds in the respective bond category.40 In this context Collective Action 
Clauses are modeled as simple majority voting clauses, allowing a majority owning 75% of the 
bonds to change the repayment terms for all bonds. In the example creditors holding 50% of 
the bond’s principle amount already accepted the exchange-offer with two creditors left, each 
holding 25%. This results in the following game: 
 
                                                 
40 The alternative way to achieve a debt restructuring via an exchange-offer – as in the case of Argentina - is an 
amendment of the financial terms of the bond. Necessary is that all creditors, in the case of U.S. law bonds or a 
supermajority of creditors in the case of UK law, accept the change at a bondholders meeting. Majority action 
clauses aim to make a supermajority sufficient for this amendment in the case of U.S. law. 
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The worst each creditor can get now is the present value (ω) of the exchange-offer. Therefore, 
the single creditor can decide independently of his fellow creditors and would accept the 
exchange-offer only if ω > Ω - qL. Hence, the collective action clause would ensure collective 
power to reject an unsatisfactory offer and consequently reduce the risk of being left alone as 
the only one exerting expenses for a political campaign.  
In contrast, ECs worsen the situation to the holdout creditors. ECs target the non-financial 
terms of a bond. Each creditor that accepts the bond exchange agrees, as his last act as 
bondholder, to change these non-financial terms in order to make the old bond less attractive 
for the holdout creditors (Roubini and Setser 2004: 168).41 But making a bond less attractive to 
the remaining bondholders by e.g., reducing its liquidity through a delisting from the secondary 
market is nothing less than imposing a loss to the rejecting creditors once a necessary majority 
accepts the offer. In the theoretical framework this situation seems familiar from the earlier 
analysis. The loss by changing the non-financial terms of the bond is denoted by Θ: 
                                                 
41 Argentina integrated exit consents in its exchange-offer. In its prospectus of the exchange-offer, Argentina 
points out several times that a potential risk factor for not tendering is that it might delist the old securities from 
the secondary markets, thereby strongly reducing the liquidity of these bonds. However, up to now this delisting of 
the remaining bonds has not taken place yet.  
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This yields that accepting is preferred if 
(5) ω > Ω -[Θ+(1+q)L]/2. 
Comparing this equation with (3) it becomes clear that the potential loss imposed through the 
threat of Exit Consents has the same effect on the decision process as a general bonus payment. 
But contrary to the bonus payment, this is without the side effect of additional costs for the 
debtor. Hence, this instrument clearly favors the debtor.  
II.8. Conclusion 
The creditor coordination game in this analysis is part of a restructuring game between the 
debtor and its creditors about sharing the burden of a particular financial crisis, where conflict 
induces further costs. In this game the debtor faces a trade-off between making a lower 
exchange-offer (ω) and risking the acceptance of the creditors. Therefore, it is optimal for the 
debtor to choose the lowest level of ω with accepting still being the preferred action by 
creditors. The current analysis shows that creditors in the latest Argentinean bond restructuring 
were stuck in a stag-hunt game due to a loss imposed on the rejecting creditors once – although 
not clearly determined – a benchmark acceptance was reached. Applying the concept of risk-
dominance to this situation enables the defaulted debtor to use certain contractual elements of 
the exchange-offer for her own benefit. In sum, one can solve for the exchange-offer that is 
optimal for the debtor with: 
II. Assurance Game in Argentinean Debt Restructuring 
 41
(6) 
)2(
)
2
()1(
*
p
zLq
−
Θ+−+
−Ω=ω  
In the case of Argentina the most favored creditor clause (MFC), which would hold with 
probability p, was such a contractual element that allowed those accepting the offer to free ride 
on the efforts by holdout creditors to improve future offers. Furthermore, the debtor country 
used a contingent bonus payment z/2 – an additional amount of par bonds – in its own favor. 
From a debtor’s point of view these contingent sweeteners are superior to general bonus 
payments since the costs involved for paying these bonuses exceed their overall benefit. 
However, the advantageous effect of general bonus payments for the debtor can be replicated 
by the use of Exit Consents imposing a potential loss on the holdout minority. Exit Consents 
are often mentioned to be equal to CACs, hence making a further introduction of CACs into 
emerging market bonds redundant. But as was demonstrated, the effects of the two mechanisms 
on creditor coordination are not equal. Exit Consents provide debtors with the opportunity to 
sanction a holdout creditor, imposing the cost Θ. Conversely, CACs mitigate the coordination 
failures among creditors. The MFC as well as the Exit Consents are attractive to the debtor as 
these instruments bear no costs for the debtor when the creditor accepts. 
In conclusion, the Argentinean debt exchange-offer consisted of several contractual elements – 
familiar as well as unfamiliar – that clearly benefited the debtor in the restructuring game. 
Therefore, it is highly possible that these elements will play an important role in any future 
exchange-offer from an insolvent sovereign debtor. 
II. Assurance Game in Argentinean Debt Restructuring 
 42
II.9. Appendix 
A.1. The case of n-Players 
Since all variables are normalized to percentages of the value of the debtor’s exchange-offer 
the only influence of a broadening of the creditor base is on the share of legal costs that the 
single creditor has to bear in case of rejection.  
As has been pointed out in the two-creditor case, if all n-1 creditors accept the offer then the 
single rejecting creditor must bear the highest costs of legal action and political campaigning 
)(L . Contrary, if all n-1 creditors reject the single creditor benefits from economies of scale in 
organizing political campaigns against the debtor so that his legal costs reduce to qL  with 
5.0<q , this leads to the following payoff function for a single rejecting creditor with x 
denoting the amount of fellow rejecting creditors and n>1:42  
(1’) Lq
n
x ))1(
1
1( −−−−Ω  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 An alternative version of the costs of going to court in the case of n>2 might involve fixed costs L , for 
example, as a result of collective lawsuits. Such costs would be fixed for all rejecting creditors, but they would 
naturally decrease with the amount of fellow creditors who reject: 
x
L . Once introducing such a term into the 
game, it can swiftly be shown that an increase in the number of players, n, favours accepting as the risk dominant 
equilibrium. The reason is that being the only creditor rejecting induces the fixed costs L  (and thus a high risk) 
while being the only one accepting avoids only a minor cost of 
n
L . 
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We obtain the following payoff matrix: 
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Symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium requires indifference between acceptance and rejection; 
that is, acceptance to yield a payoff equal to that resulting from rejection:  
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The term 
1−n
x  now denotes the share of fellow creditors that must reject in order to induce 
indifference in the choice of ones strategy. Another interpretation would be to regard this as the 
probability of rejection for each of the fellow creditors. Thus, the probability of acceptance 
(b1*) in a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium turns out to be: 
 
q
q
L
Lqn
xb −
−−Ω
=−Ω−−−=−−= 1)1(1
11
1
1*1
ω
ω  
 
When (2’) holds then x (out of n-1) other creditors reject the offer so that the single creditor is 
indifferent between accepting and rejecting. The resulting symmetric equilibrium in mixed 
strategies is unique because the payoff function (1’) is increasing in x. Observe that this 
solution is identical to the one obtained in the 2-player case. For a more formal derivation of 
II. Assurance Game in Argentinean Debt Restructuring 
 44
the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, and also for cases with collective action clauses, see 
Ghosal and Miller (2003). 
According to Harsanyi and Selten (1988: 207-209) the concept of risk dominance can be 
applied to the n-creditor case in the form that the single creditor compares the deviation payoff 
for the Nash equilibria. For this purpose the single creditor observes the drop in payoff 
(depicting the risk) that arises when being the only creditor who erred in his choice of the 
equilibrium. When all n-1 fellow creditors accept (respectively reject) the exchange-offer and 
he chose reject (respectively accept) his payoff drops and reveals the risk of erring. As can be 
seen from above these corner payoffs for the single creditor do not change in comparison to the 
case of n=2. If all accept the single creditor gets the safe value of the exchange-offer )(ω   and 
avoids the low payoff as a single rejecting creditor, )( L−Ω . If all reject they obtain the higher 
payoff )( qL−Ω  and avoid the lower value of the exchange-offer )(ω  that results when being a 
single accepting creditor. Therefore, acceptance of the offer in the presented symmetric 
coordination game is risk dominant if: 
 )()( ωω −−Ω>+Ω− qLL
2
)1( Lq+−Ω>⇔ω  
 
So due to the symmetry of the game the calculus of all other players is identical to that of a 
single player and thus do not add to the logic risk dominance. This shows that the choice of 
equilibrium determined by the concept of risk dominance is not affected by the number of 
creditors involved in the restructuring. 
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III. Social Preferences in Sovereign Debt Restructuring43 
III.1. Introduction 
Avoiding conflict of interest among creditors has always been a central aspect in the debate 
regarding an institutionalized restructuring process for an insolvent sovereign debtor (see Bank 
of England 2005 as well as Roubini and Setser 2004).  Currently, this debate focuses on a 
contractual approach that centers on the inclusion of so called Collective Action Clauses 
(CACs) in emerging market bonds. These clauses would allow a supermajority of creditors to 
overrule a holdout minority in a proposed restructuring of defaulted debt. The goal is to secure 
inter-creditor equity by eliminating the incentives for free-riding. However, according to the 
nature of majority voting, the bound minority looses its bargaining power in the negotiation 
process. CACs thereby implicitly reduce the collective negotiation process to a bilateral 
agreement between the debtor government and the pivotal creditor whose acceptance will 
complete the necessary supermajority. Therefore, the majority voting might cause conflicts of 
interest among heterogeneous creditors (Bratton and Gulati 2003).  
How do some creditors differ from others? As demonstrated by the Argentinean debt swap in 
2005, this question seems to be more complex than some comments regarding the merit of the 
contractual approach without any third party moderation or coordination would suggest, (e.g., 
Kletzer 2003). In the course of this largest debt restructuring in history, different creditor 
groups, e.g., institutional investors, retail investors, vulture funds, proved to embrace 
substantially different views regarding both how to handle the negotiation process and what an 
                                                 
43 The content of this chapter is drawn largely from Engelen and Graf Lambsdorff (2007). 
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acceptable exchange-offer should look like.44 Ultimately, 24% of the creditors, especially the 
groups of vulture funds and foreign retail investors, rejected the offer made by the Argentinean 
government.45 As this paper suggests, these two groups possessed totally different reasons to 
reject the offered repayment terms. While the vulture funds specialize in free-riding, the retail 
investors might have regarded the offer as unfair. This suggests that fairness considerations can 
be an additional source of potential heterogeneity among creditors. Findings from experimental 
game theory support the argument that heterogeneity in economic decision-making can be 
related to fairness considerations. For example, in the classical ultimatum game, a proposer 
makes a suggestion regarding how to divide a joint payoff, and a responder either accepts or 
rejects the proposal. A rejection of the proposal results in zero payoff for both players. Some 
responders accept small amounts, while others depart from the perfect payoff maximization by 
rejecting shares even larger than 20 percent (Camerer 2003: 49).  
Taking this into consideration, this paper shows that an exchange-offer proposed by the debtor 
leads to reservations that might be influenced by fairness. Defining fairness as the aversion of 
inequality, this essay concludes that inequality of payoffs between debtor and creditors and also 
among different creditors or creditor groups can impact the outcome of the restructuring 
process. It’s main contribution is to identify a potential source of heterogeneity among different 
creditors or creditor groups and the impact that this heterogeneity might have on the 
effectiveness of intra-creditor coordination in the course of different voting procedures. It 
begins with the bargaining framework surrounding the renegotiation process between a debtor 
                                                 
44 For a survey on the Argentinean default and its restructuring see Blustein (2005) and Damill et al. (2005). 
45 Vulture funds usually buy defaulted sovereign debt on the secondary market far below face value and initiate 
litigation for full repayment. As this might threaten the success of the whole restructuring process, some examples 
of settlement payments to these funds have occurred. Retail investors, in contrast, consist mostly of individuals 
who invested their pension savings in Argentinean bonds shortly before the default.  
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government and its private bondholders (III.2.). Based on the experiences regarding 
heterogeneity from the Argentinean debt restructuring (III.3.), the analysis introduces 
inequality aversion as an additional cause of heterogeneity (III.4.). This will lead to an analysis 
of the resulting creditor payoffs in an exchange-offer with inequality among accepting and 
rejecting creditors (III.5.) and the employment of majority voting (III.6.) as compared to a 
bondholder meeting (III.7.).  
III.2. Restructuring as an Ultimatum Game 
Sovereign debtors receive credit from the international capital markets in order to finance 
governmental investments that are intended to foster the economic development of the 
economy. The repayment of the debt is guaranteed by tax revenues, which are expected to 
grow in the future. However, sometimes expectations are too high, or reality is unfavorable, 
which might result in the debtor traveling on a debt path that is not sustainable. A characteristic 
of this type of unsustainable development is that the present value of future repayment 
obligations is higher than the present value of future repayments that can still be regarded as 
sustainable in both economic and political terms. The debtor country is in a state of insolvency 
that necessitates restructuring the debt including a haircut that the private creditors must take 
on their claims. The goal is to bring the debtor back to a sustainable debt path and thereby back 
to solvency. 
The main difference for sovereign debtors from the insolvency of a private company is that the 
future repayments do not represent the maximum payment capability but rather the debtor’s 
maximum payment willingness, which is strongly influenced by political sentiments. The 
reason for this is that sovereign debtors are not liable to any legal jurisdiction, which has led to 
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very few cases of successful legal enforcement of contractual claims.46 Therefore, besides the 
threat of litigation, the incentive to avoid measures of economic punishment from creditors – 
like the temporal exclusion from the international financial markets – encourages the 
fulfillment of these obligations (Eaton and Gersovitz 1981). Political pressure can also act as an 
incentive for contractual conformity. Such pressure might come from multinational financial 
institutions or governments of countries that host the leading international financial centers. 
This shows that the barrier to the insolvency of a sovereign debtor is at least partially 
determined by debtor government discretion. For example, in the case of the latest Argentinean 
debt restructuring, the debtor government under president Nestor Kirchner signaled its 
willingness to aim at an average primary budget surplus for the subsequent 25 years of 2.6% 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (GCAB 2004). However, the Global Committee of Argentina 
Bondholder (GCAB), which operated as an umbrella representation body for various 
committees of private creditors, based their valuation on a primary budget surplus projection of 
3.3% GDP for the same time period.47 Based on the estimates of the committee, this difference 
in the primary surplus projections would have had an impact on the present value of future 
repayments equivalent to USD 17 billion. This shows that the process of sovereign debt 
restructuring includes the bargaining of a specific future repayment plan in a range between 
“minimum payment willingness” and “maximum payment capability”.48 The difference can be 
regarded as a “pie” that must be divided between the debtor and the creditors. Various models 
                                                 
46 See Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006: 72-73) for a list of such cases. 
47 This figure is calculated using identical assumptions for GDP growth.  
48 Most of the models on sovereign debt restructuring recognize this difference between payment capacity and 
willingness (Haldane et al. 2002, 2005 and Ghosal and Miller 2003). The most prominent argument in favor of 
this difference is to provide an incentive for the debtor to undertake costly economic reforms because a positive 
difference would mean that the debtor country would participate in any improvement of the economic conditions 
of the country.   
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in bargaining theory reveal that the bargaining framework is the key to the division of the pie. 
Which side is allowed to make the first proposal? Who makes a second or even third proposal? 
How costly are rejections? Will an opportunity be provided for communication prior to making 
proposals? Is an independent third party involved for arbitration? These are the crucial issues 
that are organized by the bargaining framework, and they are essential to determine the 
bargaining power between the debtor and creditors (Camerer 2003: ca. 151-194). 
How is bargaining currently structured? Different versions are suggested in the literature. 
Actually, this is the most crucial aspect of the discussion regarding an institutionalized 
mechanism for an orderly restructuring process of sovereign debt. The reason for this dispute is 
that the structure of bargaining has been changing as the debt profile of sovereign debtors 
evolves, particularly from bank loans to bonds as the primary source of external financial 
resources.  
Motivated by the Latin-American debt crises of the 1980s, the advocates of a pure market-
based (contractual) approach – which means no third party intervention into the crises 
resolution – are on one side, like Kletzer and Wright (2000) and Kletzer (2003).49 They assume 
                                                 
49 In a sense, the case of the Argentinean debt restructuring should have been the first resolution process without 
major (third party) official sector intervention, e.g., by the IMF or other multinational institutions, and, therefore, 
should have been an example of this still evolving pure market-based (contractual) restructuring process. 
However, due to commitment tactics, the case of the Argentinean debt exchange-offer introduced a caveat to this. 
The Argentinean exchange-offer received a participation rate of 76%. Since the bonds that were included in the 
restructuring did not provide the possibility for majority voting, the Argentinean government must receive all old 
bonds to resolve the default. Hence, continuing to launch further (possibly higher) exchange-offers until all bonds 
in default are exchanged would be a common procedure. However, through the inclusion of a “most favored 
creditor clause” in the new bonds and the passage of a law that prohibits the government from making a higher 
offer, Argentina generally committed itself to not making higher offers. This causes opacity with regard to the 
future of the rejecting creditors and thereby to the development of the pure market-based restructuring process 
(Porzecanski 2005, Scott 2006, and Miller and Thomas 2006).  
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that the bargaining power is one-sided and located with the creditors since they would propose 
the terms of any revised repayment schedule to the debtor.50 However, the experience with 
sovereign debt restructuring over the last decade tells a different story. Accompanied by the 
rise of bond markets as the major source for emerging market financing, the restructuring 
procedure has changed substantially toward a process of exchange-offers proposed by the 
debtor to its creditors (Roubini and Setser 2004). This offer mostly comprises the swap of old 
bonds for new ones containing revised financial terms for repayment. The creditors then can 
solely choose between acceptance and rejection.  
Miller and Garcia-Fronti (2003) and Dhillon et al. (2006) seized this topic and analyzed the 
Argentinean debt restructuring of February 2005 in the tradition of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) 
by applying the concept of a Rubinstein Game with alternating offers. In this game, the creditor 
can also solely decide between acceptance and rejection of the offer made from the 
countervailing party. However, if he rejects the proposal in the current period, he becomes the 
one to propose in the next period. So, both parties, proposer and responder, know that if the 
game moves to the next round of bargaining, they will switch positions.  
When applied to the case of the Argentinean debt restructuring, the authors interpreted the 
reaction from the GCAB after the debtor made its first offer in Dubai (2004) to be such an 
alternating offer.51 However, the final result of the Argentinean debt restructuring questions the 
interpretation of a Rubinstein Game. The committees recommended its members to reject the 
second offer made by the debtor and tried to get involved in a bilateral dialogue by offering 
what they regarded as acceptable terms. However, the Argentinean government simply ignored 
                                                 
50 Actually, this is also a necessary assumption to sustain their renegotiation-proof reputation equilibrium. 
51 The GCAB, as the representation body of private creditors at that time in line with the credit markets, strongly 
dismissed this repayment offer and demanded more than double the size of the proposal. 
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these proposals and continued with its unilateral approach. Ultimately, a large majority of 
creditors accepted the Argentinean proposal despite the lack of dialogue between the debtor 
and the creditors (“A victory by default? - The successful restructuring of Argentina's debts has 
set a painful new benchmark for creditors”, The Economist, 5. March 2005). This means that, 
although the committees might have had a different perception of their role, they simply did not 
have the power to become a bargaining participant in such a Rubinstein Game.52 Apparently, 
the debtor government did not care about the representation bodies as long as the majority of 
creditors would accept their offer. However, this does not mean that a debt restructuring can 
never become a Rubinstein Game, but it would require a high degree of effective coordination 
among different creditor groups. The representation body is a serious player in the bargaining 
process only if it can make a credible threat to impose sanctions, such as advancing to the next 
renegotiation round in case the offer is too low. An example of a representation body of private 
creditors that exhibited this type of credibility is the Bank Advisory Committees from the 
1980s. They guaranteed a high degree of coordination among the creditor banks during the 
restructuring process (Rieffel 2003). 
So, what kind of bargaining framework was used in the case of Argentina? The Argentinean 
government refused to participate in a clearly structured negotiation process but rather 
unilaterally proposed the following two repayment offers: the Dubai and the Buenos Aires 
proposal.53 The former proposal was merely a public announcement of the key details for a 
possible exchange-offer and was presented in 2004 at the IMF/Worldbank meeting in Dubai. 
                                                 
52 Dhillon et al. (2005) suggested that this disempowerment was at least partially caused by New York investment 
funds that took over as a negotiating counterparty at considerable cost to the average creditor as they admit.  
53 Other examples of unilaterally proposed exchange-offers are the debt restructurings in Pakistan (1999), Ukraine 
(1998-2000), Ecuador (1999-2000), Russia (1998-2000), Moldova (2002), Uruguay (2003), and the Dominican 
Republic (2005). For a detailed description of the restructuring terms offered see chapter V. 
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These details were strongly rejected by the creditors. The second, slightly improved proposal 
was made at the beginning of 2005 with a six-week tender period, during which 76% of the 
creditors exchanged their old bonds for new ones, thereby accepting an implicit haircut on the 
nominal value, including past due interest, of around 70%. With regards to the bargaining 
framework, these facts suggest the repetition of an ultimatum game framework between the 
debtor government and the creditor side, at least for the creditors lacking a powerful 
representation. In contrast to a Rubinstein Game, the positions of proposer and responder 
remain the same in case of rejection in a repeated ultimatum game when negotiation rounds 
advance. Therefore, total bargaining power in the next stage will again be on the side of the 
current proposer. The decisive difference between a Rubinstein Game and a repeated ultimatum 
game is that in the latter case only one side makes proposals for the division of the pie. Apart 
from rejection, the receiving side, therefore, has no influence on the shares offered. Actually, 
the GCAB admits this lack of influence in the approach to the second and final offer. In its last 
investor road-show presentation, it stated, “Argentina has not engaged in constructive dialogue 
with leading creditor groups. The current proposal does not reflect any input from GCAB.” 
GCAB (2005).  
III.3. Heterogeneity among Creditors 
In bargaining theory, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in an ultimatum game is quite 
unspectacular. In such a game, the proposing side exhibits the whole bargaining power and can, 
therefore, secure virtually the whole pie. However, why did a majority of creditors accept the 
offer while a minority rejected it? This would imply heterogeneous reservation values among 
creditors. Apparently, the groups of foreign retail investors and vulture funds must have 
possessed higher reservation values than the other creditor groups since they mostly rejected 
the offer (Sgard 2005 and Gelpern 2005).  
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Haldane et al. (2005) presented a model containing different holdout costs among creditors 
caused by different investment horizons, compensation structures, or different degrees of risk 
aversion. Although not explicitly stated by the authors, the same rationale would also be valid 
for differences in litigation costs (e.g., due to judicial experience) among creditors. These 
different holdout-costs translate into heterogeneous outside options, e.g., net proceeds in the 
case of litigation.54 However, as each creditor accepts an exchange-offer only if it is higher than 
his outside option, different reservation values with the lowest holdout cost comprising the 
highest reservation value result. When applied to the case of the Argentinean debt 
restructuring, this argument might be convincing to justify the behavior of vulture funds and 
other so-called bottom-fishers as these investors are highly specialized in the handling of 
distressed debt. However, it is not truly convincing in the case of the retail investors. Actually, 
retail investors tend to have relatively higher holdout-costs as compared to institutional 
investors due to a higher degree of risk aversion or less experience in litigation. Therefore, 
according to Haldane et al. (2005), this creditor group should have an even lower reservation 
value than the institutional investors.  
Therefore, some commentators suggest that the retail investors lacked the ability for 
sophisticated information processing of the economic data (Gelpern 2005 and Salmon 2004). 
This would lead retail investors to a wrong supposition regarding the maximum that could be 
achieved in this type of negotiation process. This uncertainty would be amplified when 
creditors prefer to follow the choice of the majority of creditors but are uncertain about what 
others will do (Engelen and Graf Lambsdorff 2005). Understandably, households often do not 
                                                 
54 Since legal enforcement of debt claims by a sovereign entity is limited, very few cases of successful holdout 
litigation in recent sovereign debt restructurings have occurred (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 2006 and Miller 
and Thomas 2006). Furthermore, as these cases involved complex legal strategies to achieve the resulting 
enforcement, different litigation costs might be essential in explaining heterogeneity among creditors. 
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have the ability and knowledge to realistically asses these issues. Nevertheless, this argument is 
not completely sound because badly informed retail investors may also erroneously accept a 
low offer. Whether an average lack of information increases rejection or not remains 
indeterminate.  
Finally, some sources also argued that the side deals that were offered to some creditor groups 
would have been a decisive element in this restructuring, thereby leading to heterogeneous 
behavior.55 Although such deals are hard to judge and are not typically publicly announced, 
such elements surely occurred between the government and the Argentinean pension funds. 
Unquestionably, these deals have influenced the pension funds’ early decision to accept the 
second offer. However, this logically was not solely responsible for a participation rate of 76% 
since this would imply that all but the rejecting creditors would have benefited from such side 
deals; this is an argument that is not truly convincing.  
III.4. Fairness and Reservation Values56 
An alternative argument for the decision by the retail investors to reject the offer made by the 
Argentinean government is that this offer was considered unfair. Experimental game theory 
shows that such considerations influence the economic decisions that people make. Especially 
in the ultimatum game framework, the theoretical equilibrium has become a rare result. Many 
experiments have illustrated that on average a 60/40 offer characterizes the results in contrast to 
                                                 
55 E.g., Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005: 40) noted the following in their assessment of the quasi-par bond that 
was offered in the Argentinean debt restructuring: “This bond was issued in indexed pesos only and targeted 
specifically to local pension funds, which were coaxed into an agreement under which they received the quasi par 
bond along with regulatory benefits.” 
56 Although somewhat limiting, the terms fairness and social preferences are used interchangeably in the course of 
this analysis. 
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99/1  (Berninghaus et al. 2006: 221-224). An unfair offer of 80/20 is rejected in about 25% of 
all cases. This relation can further change due to factors like gender, academic major, race, 
testosterone level, or cultural background (Camerer 2003: 64-74). Based on these findings, 
some models from the field of behavioral game theory have evolved aiming to capture 
preferences for equity as opposed to pure income maximization. Precisely these considerations 
can impact the renegotiation of sovereign debt.  
In order to analyze this impact of fairness considerations on the creditor decision, the model of 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is applied, which achieved great success in explaining experimental 
results. This model is based on a consideration of inequality aversion — envy in case of 
disadvantageous inequality and guilt in case of advantageous inequality. Further, a repeated 
ultimatum game is assumed, which, due to a high discount on future payments, boils down to a 
simple decision by the creditor to accept some unfairness now or see the pie shrink. 
Apparently, this decision is similar to a one-shot ultimatum game.57 
A pie of value 1 is to be divided between a debtor and each of his n+1 creditors. The debtor 
offers ω  ∈(0,1) of the pie to each creditor.58 In case the creditor rejects the offer, the debtor 
will make a new offer, ωω >) , in the next period. However, since the continuation of 
bargaining incurs costs to both parties, the future bargaining results are discounted by 1≤δ .59 
                                                 
57 Experimental studies have shown that, due to a reputation argument, the average behavior is more competitive 
and that conflict rates are higher when subjects play against the same opponent repeatedly (Slembeck 1999). For 
simplicity, however, we disregard these reputation effects. 
58 The debtor in default is unlikely to offer more than half of the pie, which is a result that is seldom observed in 
experimental ultimatum games. 
59 A discount rate below unity indicates that the pie is decreasing over time so that an efficient outcome requires 
an immediate settlement. However, as Dhillon et al. (2006) showed in their analysis, the pie is possibly increasing 
over time as the debtor experiences a substantial economic recovery. In this situation, waiting would be value 
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Assuming that the discount rate is rather large, so that ωδω )> . This leads to the following 
value function for creditor i if he accepts the exchange-offer: 
(1) ))(1()21()( ωδωβωαωω )−′−−−−= aV iiai  
This value function consists of three components. The first describes the pure monetary value 
of the exchange-offer. Concerning the three subsequent terms, some working assumptions were 
necessary. In laboratory experiments, players observe the income of other players and view 
their own payoffs in comparison to these. In reality, such a reference group of other players is 
more difficult to determine. Therefore, it is posited that each player (creditor) compares his 
own income to the income that the debtor obtains from him but feels indifferent about how 
much money the debtor obtains from others.60 Thus, if a creditor is given an unequal share, i.e., 
less than 5.0=ω , he envies the debtor by (1 2 )iα ω− . The parameter 0>iα  captures the 
aversion of the creditor for disadvantageous inequality (envy). This parameter is multiplied 
with the difference of the debtor’s income from bargaining (1-ω ) and that of the creditor (ω ).  
Each player (creditor) also compares his own income to that of his fellow creditors. The logic 
could be that all creditors’ actions help to discipline the debtor. Therefore, free-riding on the 
joint goal of sanctioning the debtor might induce sentiments of guilt, which is captured by 
(1 )( )i aβ ω δω′− − ) . The parameter iβ  depicts the aversion to advantageous inequality vis-à-vis 
other creditors (guilt). Standard assumptions are 10 <≤ iβ  and ii αβ ≤ . Guilt is felt toward 
those creditors that reject the offer, leaving them the reduced income ωδ ) . The absolute share 
                                                                                                                                                           
enhancing so that efficiency requires a settlement in the future.  
60 This judgment seems firmly based on experimental findings that third party income has little impact on the 
outcome in ultimatum games (Camerer 2003: 80-81). 
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of accepting creditors is denoted by na ≤≤0 , but, for the sake of convenience, the relative 
share is written naa /=′  with 10 ≤′≤ a . Introducing the working assumption that the 
representative creditor cares as much about comparisons of his own income to that of all other 
creditors as comparisons with the debtor. This is an arbitrary assumption. While empirical 
research would have to determine its adequacy, it seems to be not totally at odds with intuition. 
Due to the working assumption, the last term is multiplied by a′ . Obviously, if 1=′a , fairness 
has an influence on the value for the creditor, except when 5.0=ω , which indicates that the 
debtor offers an equal sharing. For the sake of simplicity, exchange-offers 0.5ω >  are 
disregarded. Theoretically, such offers might induce creditors’ feelings of guilt vis-à-vis the 
debtor, but little relevance exists for such concerns.  
In contrast, if the representative creditor rejects the offer, he obtains: 
(2) )()2()( ωδωαωδδαωδω ))) −′−−−= aV iiri  
Comparable to the value for acceptance, this term includes the monetary value of the (higher) 
offer in the next period and the envy that the creditor will bear vis-à-vis the debtor. However, 
as the present value of this future offer is below the current offer, the creditors that reject the 
offer in the current period will also envy the accepting fellow creditors. This is depicted in the 
third term and depends on the share of fellow creditors that accepted the current offer. 
Comparing the value function in (1) and (2), the decision that is taken by the fellow creditors 
clearly influences the payoffs of acceptance or rejection.    
The creditor will accept the exchange-offer made by the debtor if: 
(3) 
)()2())(1()21( ωδωαωδδαωδωδωβωαω )))) −′−−−≥−′−−−− aa iiii  
)]1()2(1[
)1(
aa ii
i
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Proposition 1: As a creditor’s concern for envy increases, that is, the higher iα , the offer by 
the debtor needed for inducing acceptance also increases. The proof follows directly from 
equation (2). 
Proposition 2: Creditors will base their decision whether to accept the exchange-offer on the 
behavior of their colleague creditors. Acceptance by others may induce acceptance by the 
representative creditor.  
Proof: If 1=′a , the expression simplifies to:  
(3’) ]31[
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i
i
α
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−+≥ )  
In contrast, if 0=′a , the second term in (2’) increases due to the decreasing denominator: 
(3’’) ]21[
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For a given offer ω  with
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− ) , the representative creditor bases 
his decision on that of other creditors. He will follow the herd. This effect relates to his dislike 
for a difference in his income as compared to that of his fellow creditors. He dislikes rejecting 
if others obtain higher income by accepting. However, he also dislikes accepting while the 
others engage in jointly penalizing an unfair debtor. The following alternative explanation for 
why creditors “run with the herd“ has been suggested by Engelen and Graf Lambsdorff (2005): 
The fixed costs of lawsuit and political campaigns can be shared among creditors, reducing 
individual costs and increasing the willingness to joint as more colleague reject an offer by the 
debtor.  
We note in passing that the more diverse the creditors are with respect to the aversion to 
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inequality, the more heterogeneous are their reservation values. As retail investors are in 
general perceived to react more emotionally than institutional investors, this might suggest a 
possible explanation for their behavior.  
III.5. Herding and Intra-Creditor Fairness 
When the debtor extends an exchange-offer, he can use certain contractual elements in order to 
support acceptance among creditors. For example, in the Argentinean debt restructuring, the 
debtor employed a most favored creditor clause, contingent bonus payments and exit consents 
with the goal to achieve a more favorable outcome.  
The most favored creditor clause should guarantee to every creditor that accepted the offer in 
the first place participation in any potential improvement that would be offered to the 
remaining creditors. So the accepting creditors would receive an additional payment in the case 
that some holdouts continued to successfully negotiate with the debtor. However, this clause 
was not flawless as it includes ways to circumvent this contractual commitment. In addition, 
the Argentinean government announced the extension of the volume of the most preferred par 
bonds that can be interpreted as a contingent bonus arrangement. Because the par bonds offered 
were distributed among the accepting creditors, this was an incentive to favor a participation 
rate just above the threshold for the larger amount but not higher as this would reduce their 
personal share of par bonds. Finally, the debtor used exit consents to support the acceptance of 
his exchange-offer by threatening to change the non-financial terms of the bonds. As control of 
a super-majority of the bonds is usually sufficient, even under U.S. law, to change the non-
financial terms of the bond (e.g., the listing on a secondary market), this is a threat to a 
rejecting minority. A debtor may fail to bind in this minority in the change of the financial 
terms. However, he can threaten to modify non-financial terms and reduce the value of their 
bonds. Therefore, the question of how much influence can fairness in the form of inequality 
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aversion have on the effect of those contractual elements is interesting.  
All these additional contractual arrangements employed in the Argentinean debt restructuring 
had one common element, which is that all would increase the difference of nominal payoffs to 
creditors that fail to vote collectively. Hence, all of these clauses aim at increasing the 
inequality of payments between accepting and rejecting creditors. Consequently, fairness 
considerations in the form of intra-creditor inequality aversion alter the reservation value of the 
respective creditor and foster herding behavior: 
(4) 
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In this case, the term ε  captures the effect of contractual elements that aim to increase the 
inequality in payments if creditors can not coordinate on a collective vote. As all of these 
contractual elements have the same impact, this ε  can be interpreted either as a bonus payment 
to the accepting creditor due to the effect of a most favored creditor clause or as a loss to the 
rejecting creditors due to the effect of exit consents. Thereby, if ε  is interpreted as a bonus 
payment for the accepting creditors, the first two terms on the left hand side would be altered as 
the bonus payment would increase the monetary value of the current offer. This would make 
accepting even more favorable. However, for simplicity, the analysis abstains from this 
detailed differentiation between certain contractual elements. As for the herding effect, only the 
difference in payoffs between accepting and rejecting creditors is decisive. This shows that 
once acceptance is sufficiently high, ( βα
β
+>′ i
a ), the effect of herding is amplified so that 
the reservation value decreases, which benefits the debtor. 
Proposition 3: If the debtor employs contractual elements that increase the difference in payoff 
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between accepting and rejecting creditors, then these elements will foster herding behavior. 
Proof: If 1=′a , the expression (3) gives:  
(4’) ]31[
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In contrast, if 0=′a , the term increases to: 
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A comparison of the above terms with (3’) and (3’’) shows that, as long as 0>ε , the herding 
effect among creditors is amplified. The reason for this is that, in the case that all fellow 
creditors accept the offer (a’=1), rejecting becomes even less favorable for the single creditor 
than in (3`) due to the disadvantageous effect of the additional contractual elements. Therefore, 
the single creditors will accept an even lower current exchange-offer if he believes that all 
fellow creditors will join. In contrast, for the case that all creditors reject the current offer, the 
single creditor will need a higher exchange-offer to induce him to diverge from his fellow 
creditors. The amplification of this herding results from the fact that deviation from the 
majority of the fellow creditors is more costly as the additional contractual elements widen the 
payoff difference between accepting and rejecting creditors.  
III.6. Fairness and Majority Voting 
After years of intensive debate, experts agree that the employment of majority voting is a 
crucial element to avoid conflict of interests among creditors or creditor groups. The concept of 
majority voting is based on the desire to protect the restructuring from the potentially disruptive 
influence of vulture funds. This should be achieved by the coercive inclusion of the holdout 
creditor in the debt swap as long as a sufficient majority of creditors accepted the restructuring 
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terms. Motivation for this is based on the fact that, as long as the legal claims are at least 
theoretically enforceable, every creditor can veto the restructuring and demand the full 
repayment. So if the group of vetoing creditors is small enough, the debtor may find that 
paying these holdouts in full is advantageous and then finishes the restructuring with the other 
creditors. However, since this free-riding by a minority contradicts the concept of intra-creditor 
equity, the inclusion of CACs – and thereby a majority voting – should help to mitigate a 
potential conflict of interests among creditors.61 Therefore these CACS are the key element of 
the contractual approach of crises resolution. 
CACs usually allow a certain supermajority to change the financial terms and thereby reduce 
the contractually agreed debt repayments. So, if there are CACs included in the bond contracts, 
the debtor targets the supermajority threshold to achieve success with his exchange-offer. As 
has been demonstrated, the debtor, therefore, needs to offer at least the reservation value of the 
pivotal creditor who is necessary to fulfill this supermajority. Following from equation (3), as 
the remaining creditors are bound once the necessary acceptance rate is reached, the pivotal 
creditor’s decision becomes: 
(5) 
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The decisive difference for equation (3) is that the pivotal creditor implicitly votes for the rest 
of the rejecting creditors because if he accepts the financial terms as offered he at the same time 
                                                 
61 Some scholars question whether CACs increase the efficiency of the renegotiation process. For example, 
Haldane et al. (2005) presented a model of bilateral bargaining with two-sided information asymmetries. In this 
context, the inclusion of CACs reduces the probability of reaching an agreement in the first period, thereby 
increasing the inefficiency of the bargaining process. 
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overrules all rejecting creditors. In contrast, if he rejects, the debtor can not gain the necessary 
support so that the financial terms of the bond remain unchanged. Therefore, the pivotal 
creditor can never feel guilt for the rejecting creditors, so the term on the left side lacks this 
influence, which reduces his reservation value. 
Proposition 4: When CACs are employed, intra-creditor inequality aversion reduces the 
pivotal creditor’s reservation values. The proof follows directly from the difference between 
equations (3) and (5).  
So, the employment of majority voting clauses reduces the nominal amount that is necessary to 
make the pivotal creditor indifferent between accepting and rejecting as compared to a situation 
without such clauses.  
III.7. Fairness in a Bondholder Meeting 
However, the exchange-offer is not the only possible structure for a bilateral restructuring 
process. Alternatively, the voting can take place in a bondholder meeting. The main difference 
between an exchange-offer and such a meeting is that, in a bondholder meeting, creditors can 
conditionally accept an offer based on the decisions of other creditors. Therefore, the set of 
feasible strategies is increased. Acceptance would be conditioned commonly on a 
supermajority also accepting. Therefore, the choice of the pivotal creditor affects the payoffs to 
all fellow creditors regardless of their acceptance or rejection of the offer. If majority voting is 
employed, this pivotal creditor is the one that completes the threshold level.62   
                                                 
62 If no majority voting is employed, then the creditor with the highest reservation value is the pivotal creditor as 
unanimity among creditors is required to change the financial terms of the bond. 
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The pivotal creditor, therefore, determines collective behavior because an acceptance rate 
below the voting threshold is not sufficient to change the financial terms of the bond. The other 
accepting creditors get the new terms proposed only if the pivotal creditor accepts. In contrast, 
in an exchange-offer, the creditors who accepted receive the new bonds independent of the 
pivotal creditor’s decision. So, in an exchange-offer, the acceptance rate can become a variety 
of values. In a bondholder meeting, however, the overall acceptance can only be either zero or 
one. This means that, as the pivotal creditor’s decision applies to all fellow creditors, 
acceptance becomes favorable when: 
(6) 
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Proposition 5: If creditors vote in a bondholder meeting, the pivotal creditor’s reservation 
value is not affected by herding among creditors. The proof follows directly from the difference 
between (5) and (6).  
The lack of herding is caused by the fact that the pivotal creditor’s decision is binding for all 
fellow creditors irrespective of whether he accepts or rejects the terms proposed. As revealed 
by (6), this increases the reservation value demanded by the pivotal creditor and, thus, the 
overall offer that a debtor must make. The reason rests with the fact that a rejecting pivotal 
creditor can not experience envy towards accepting colleagues, as his decision forced them 
equally into rejection.  
III.8. Conclusion 
Up to now, the debate about an institutionalized process for restructuring sovereign debt has 
generally remained vague regarding the question about the specific structure of the negotiation 
III. Social Preferences in Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
 65
processes between a debtor and its private creditors. However, the most prominent common 
element of all restructuring processes over the last few decades between a sovereign debtor and 
its private creditors has been that the debtor launches an exchange-offer that can be either 
accepted or rejected by the creditors.63 This suggests that the bargaining framework takes the 
form of an ultimatum game with only minor outside options since third party enforcement 
seems to be limited. As commonly found in an ultimatum game, the equilibrium strategy for 
the single creditor is characterized by a reservation so that the creditor accepts any exchange-
offer above that threshold level. Furthermore, taking into consideration the experiences from 
the most recent Argentinean restructuring process, these reservations might be heterogeneous 
among different types of creditors. 
Following the arguments made in this essay, heterogeneity concerning fairness consideration 
might be a possible influence that can lead to different reservation values. The more the 
creditor envies the debtor in an unequal sharing of the surplus from the resolution of the debt 
dispute, the higher his reservation value becomes. Additionally, the more he dislikes the 
unequal treatment as compared to his fellow creditors who accept the current offer, the lower 
his reservation value becomes. This implies that his incentive to run with the herd is higher. 
The application of additional contractual elements (e.g., most favored creditor clause, 
contingent bonus payments, or exit consents) enables the debtor to lower his restructuring costs 
by fostering the herding effect among creditors.  
Further, this herding can have an effect on the results of different voting procedures because 
the prevailing concept of a contractual approach allows the debtor to decide which way he 
prefers to approach his creditors for restructuring unsustainable sovereign debt. He can propose 
                                                 
63 See chapter V for a summary of the restructuring details. 
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his demanded changes of the financial terms of the bond either by making an exchange-offer to 
swap old for new bonds or calling for a bondholder meeting. As has been indicated, only the 
latter process is free of herding as the bondholder meeting does not allow for an unequal 
treatment of creditors irrespective of their voting behavior. This might suggest why debtor 
countries seem to have a clear preference for exchange-offers since a bondholder meeting 
supports coordination among different creditors or creditor groups. 
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IV. Inter-temporal Discrimination among Creditors 
IV.1. Introduction 
In the past, mitigating intra-creditor coordination failures has always been a core intention of 
any proposal for an orderly process of restructuring sovereign bonds. However, the discussion 
about such coordination failures has been limited to the problem of some holdout-creditors 
seeking a free ride on the restructuring efforts of their fellow creditors. Further fuelled by 
sporadic cases of vulture funds (e.g., Elliott Associates v. Peru in 2000), which gained high 
settlement payments from debtors while being involved in restructuring processes, this single-
edge deployment of the term intra-creditor coordination failures has become increasingly 
popular.64 This conveys the impression that the sole limitation of free-riding – e.g., by the use 
of majority voting among creditors at a bondholder meeting – would be sufficient to result in 
effective coordination among creditors. 
Besides the free-riding motive, there might also be additional intra-creditor coordination 
failures among creditors. As the term suggests, a coordination failure is a failure to effectively 
coordinate creditors in the restructuring process. Broadly speaking, coordination means the 
regulation of diverse elements into an integrated and harmonious operation. Thus, translated 
into the context of the restructuring of sovereign bonds, intra-creditor coordination describes 
the reconciliations of diverse creditor interests in order to gain integration and harmony in 
                                                 
64 Vulture funds are investors that buy bonds of troubled debtors at a high discount on the secondary market and 
start litigation for full repayment. This might even lead to a disruptive effect on the overall restructuring process. 
The goal is to free-ride on the restructuring effort of the fellow creditors and to receive a higher debt repayment. 
The most popular example of such a vulture strategy is the case of Elliott Associates in 2000. The small fund 
bought Peruvian debt and tried to sabotage the whole restructuring process. In the end, this strategy succeeded, 
and Elliott received a settlement payment about five times its initial investment. 
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creditor behavior, which is creditor voting on restructuring terms. However, by this 
argumentation, any diversity of creditor interests is a potential source of coordination failure, as 
it might impede the unanimity of creditor voting. In the latest major debt restructuring in 
Argentina, for instance, about one out of every four creditors did not accept the restructuring 
terms proposed by the debtor. But rejection was not simply due to free-riding motives. Whereas 
most vulture funds started aggressive litigation immediately, the rejecting retail investors (the 
majority of the holdouts) took a different route and have waited for negotiations that could lead 
to an improved repayment offer ever since (Miller and Thomas 2006).  
Therefore, it is necessary to broaden the discussion about effective creditor coordination by 
asking what the potential reasons are for a diversity of creditors’ interest and, consequently, to 
what extent the currently applied restructuring process (especially the possibility to launch an 
exchange-offer) gives the debtor the opportunity to benefit by exploiting this diversity. 
Heterogeneity among creditors, such as due to differences in risk aversion, compensation, or 
investment horizons, has already been explored by Haldane, et al. (2005). Based on this 
heterogeneity among creditors, these authors show that negotiation between debtor and 
heterogeneous creditors will never reach an efficient solution based on two-sided asymmetric 
information. Moreover, Engelen and Graf Lambsdorff (2007) have demonstrated that social 
preferences among creditors can also lead to heterogeneous reservation values on the creditor 
side.65  
To tie up to this previous work, this essay focuses on the second question and analyses the 
impact of creditor heterogeneity on the bargaining process between the debtor country and 
bondholders regarding the repayment of defaulted bonds. It will show in a more generalized 
                                                 
65 See chapter III. 
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model that with different reservation values the debtor has an incentive to employ the 
heterogeneity in an exchange-offer for an inter-temporal discrimination among creditors. This 
would foreclose effective creditor coordination in an exchange-offer. Thus, any 
institutionalized restructuring process aiming at securing intra-creditor coordination should 
take this additional cause of failure into consideration. 
As it is the currently prevailing process for sovereign debt restructuring, this paper analyses the 
evolution of the contractual approach (V.2.) and highlights a major deficiency that facilitates 
the inter-temporal discrimination among creditors (V.3.) mentioned above. Based on this 
analysis, the formation of a Creditor Trust is suggested (V.4.) that would not only mitigate this 
failure but would further support an effective creditor representation vis-à-vis the debtor 
country during the restructuring negotiations. 
IV.2. From Private Sector Involvement to Private Sector Ownership 
After the structure of net financial flows to the emerging markets transformed over the 1990s 
(mostly initiated by the Brady Plan), the prevailing approaches to sovereign debt restructuring, 
notably the Paris Club and the London Club, needed adapting.66 Because over the last fifteen 
years sovereign debtors received large parts of their external capital by selling bonds rather 
than by asking for bank loans, the creditor side has substantially changed from a limited 
number of commercial banks towards numerous bondholders. This initiated an intensive debate 
                                                 
66 The Paris Club is the permanent representation body of sovereign creditors in charge of restructuring bilateral 
and multilateral credit exposure towards debtor countries. The London Club, in contrast, denotes the process of ad-
hoc representation bodies of commercial bank debt. These two institutions were the two major players of 
sovereign debt restructuring during the Latin American debt crises in the 1980s. For a detailed description of their 
functioning, see Rieffel (2003). As the debt profile of most Emerging Markets has evolved, only the Paris Club is 
still active today. 
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between the official and private sector institutions on how to adequately involve private 
bondholders in the resolution process of sovereign debt crisis.67 Although somehow 
misleading, this issue has become the debate on Private Sector Involvement (PSI).68  
On the side of the official institutions (i.e., G7 and the IMF) this debate centered on two 
proposals that were titled “contractual approach” and “statutory approach.”69 The latter, 
proposed in different versions by the deputy managing director of the IMF, Anne Krueger, in 
2001, tried to establish some kind of permanent machinery comparable to an international 
bankruptcy court. Krueger’s main argument in favor of such a bankruptcy court, besides 
several other merits, was that it should shield the process from the disruptive effects of holdout 
litigation by vulture funds. Supporters of the contractual approach, however, argued that it was 
not necessary to establish such an institution to protect the process from potential free-riding 
interests from vulture funds. Including clauses in bond contracts that allow for a majority 
restructuring and majority enforcement would have a similar effect.70 Therefore, competition 
developed between these two concepts, and in 2003 it became obvious that the statutory 
approach could not find enough political support. Finally, the statutory approach was shelved, 
and the official sector solely concentrates on pursuing the inclusion of majority voting clauses 
                                                 
67 Several authors provide a thorough overview of the different institutions and concepts involved in that debate: 
Roubini and Setser (2004), Rieffel (2003), Eichengreen (2002), and Kenen (2001). 
68 The term involvement is misleading, as it suggests that the private sector has been excluded from the negative 
effects of financial crises. But private investors have taken substantial losses in asset values in all major financial 
crises since the late 1990s. Thus, the debate on PSI in the last decade is not primarily on the issue of whether 
involvement should be achieved or not but rather how the involvement should be organized.  
69 Since the contractual approach tries to avoid any third-party intervention it can be regarded to be purely market-
based while the statutory contains elements of market-based and statutory institutions.  
70 Majority restructuring provisions enable a majority of bondholders to bind in the minority for amendments of 
the financial terms of an issuance. Majority enforcement clauses support this restructuring, as they enable a 
majority of bondholders to hinder the minority to enforce their creditor rights. For further details on different types 
of clauses, see IMF (2002). 
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in newly issued bond contracts ever since (IMF 2005).  
However, competition between the two approaches of PSI was not just about different opinions 
on the best way of limiting the threat of free-riding. It was even more a competition of different 
perspectives on which institutions should own the resolution of sovereign debt crises. For 
obvious reasons, any statutory approach would need the will of all market participants to 
subordinate to a third party jurisdiction. Thus, this third party would be in control, thereby 
exhibiting ownership of the crisis resolution process.71 Under the contractual approach, in 
contrast, the restructuring would be solely market-driven. Or as U.S. Treasury Undersecretary 
John Taylor describes it in a testimony before a congressional committee, the core aspect of the 
contractual approach would be the “debtor and creditor ownership of, and participation in, the 
process.”72 Thus, by opting for the contractual approach, the official sector at the same time 
agreed to hand over the ownership of restructuring sovereign bonds to the market participants. 
And, as bondholders will most likely be the largest creditor groups for emerging market 
countries, this is nearly identical to ownership of the resolution process.  
But this was only possible because the private sector, largely represented by the Institute of 
International Finance, had laid out its own concept for restructuring sovereign debt that seemed 
to build a bridge between the two competing approaches (IIF 2002).73 In this “Action Plan” the 
IIF Special Committee on Crisis Prevention and Resolution in Emerging Markets proposed the 
broader use of Collective Action Clauses and other legal elements preventing vulture funds 
                                                 
71 Usually, there is additional sovereign debt owed to official creditors with specific conditions for an equal 
treatment among official and private creditors. Therefore, any restructuring effort must be embedded in the 
broader resolution process for the defaulted debtor so that ownership means to take over a greater responsibility 
(with a macroeconomic as well as political dimension) than just to seek enforcement of debt claims. 
72 The text can be found at www.treas.gov/press/releases/po1016.htm. 
73 The following quotes without further specification are all taken from this document. 
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activities in addition to “an international Code of Conduct to be applied in a case-by-case 
basis.” Further, the IIF Action Plan proposed the establishment of a new Private Sector 
Advisory Group (PSAG). This consultative body of market participants should “provide a 
mechanism to sustain investor confidence and, where necessary, facilitate orderly debt 
restructuring.” In cases where a debt restructuring becomes inevitable, the PSAG could 
therefore “give way to the formation of country-specific `Creditor Groups´ that would engage 
in consultation with the authorities, coordinate with the official sector, and work towards 
cooperative resolutions of debt-servicing difficulties.” Therefore, under the currently prevailing 
contractual approach, such a creditor body should be put in control; hence, it should own the 
restructuring process. This shows that the debate on sovereign debt restructuring has moved to 
the next stage. The question is no longer whether the private sector should be involved 
voluntarily or coercively but rather how the private sector will shape the details of the 
contractual approach and thereby implement private sector ownership of the restructuring 
process. 
The private sector developments of such a code of conduct led to the “Principles for Stable 
Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets,” which were presented in 
2005 and should guide debtor and creditor behavior during the negotiation process (IIF 2005). 
These Principles were issued by a Principles Consultative Group (PCG) which not only 
terminologically replaced the idea of a PSAG74 but, like the PSAG, suggested the formation of 
a creditor representation body as a useful vehicle for restructuring. However, in contrast to the 
Action Plan, the Principles circumvent a clear statement as to who would be in charge of 
establishing such an institution: “The appropriate format and role of negotiation vehicles such 
                                                 
74 In contrast to the PSAG, seven out of seventeen members of the PCG are either finance or central bank officials 
from debtor countries (IIF 2005: 18).  
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as a creditor committee or a creditor group […] should be determined flexibly and on a case-
by-case basis. […] If a creditor committee is formed, both creditors and the debtor should 
cooperate in its establishment.” (IIF 2005: 13) But the Principles remain silent as to how such a 
cooperative establishment of a creditor representation body would look like. Therefore, there is 
a need for further discussion on the topic of how to integrate the debtor country in establishing 
a creditor representation body once negotiations become unavoidable. Due to this opacity, the 
concept of a PSAG (only comprising creditor representatives) giving way to the formation of a 
CG seems to be the most realistic idea on the table up to now. 
As outlined in the IIF Action Plan, the private sector prefers a Creditor Group to be at the 
centre of the negotiation between the debtor country and its private creditors under the 
contractual approach. The competencies of such a creditor body, however, would be limited to 
moderate the negotiation. As the IIF describes it: “The purpose of the negotiation process 
between the debtor country and the Creditor Group is to arrive at an agreement on the terms of 
the restructuring (which could be in the form of a debt exchange), which would then be 
recommended or endorsed by the Creditor Group in a communication to all creditors. The 
Group would be open to seeking the views of all creditors.” (IIF 2002: 64) 
However, due to the limited competence of such a Creditor Group as a “communication link” 
(IIF 2005: 8), this would leave the debtor country to decide crucial details of the restructuring 
process. There are usually two ways that a restructuring can be implemented. First, there is the 
opportunity for the debtor country to present the demanded changes of the financial terms (e.g., 
a reduction in principal payments) to a bondholder meeting. The creditors then vote on these 
terms, and if a sufficient majority accepts the financial terms, the bonds could be changed.75 If, 
                                                 
75 Currently, the threshold for the majority is determined by jurisdiction. Bonds that were issued under U.S. law, 
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in contrast, the necessary majority is not reached, the financial terms remain, and the 
negotiation continues.  
 
Restructuring via Bondholder Meeting 
Voting according
to clauses (UAC, CAC)
Demanded amendment 
of financial termsDebtor Country
Bondholder 
meeting
Creditor II
Creditor III
Creditor I
Creditor Group as a 
“communication link”
 
 
Second, there is the opportunity to sound out market sentiments and present an exchange-offer 
to the creditor side. Thereby, the debtor country offers to exchange old bonds for new ones 
including the demanded financial terms. 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
for example, request unanimity, whereas bonds issued under UK law usually request a three-fourths majority. 
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Restructuring via Exchange-Offer 
 
 
As the IIF notes, this process can be either “negotiated” or “non-negotiated” depending on the 
degree of consultation between the debtor and a creditor representation body. For obvious 
reasons, however, the restructuring via a bondholder meeting would also involve a high degree 
of consultation between the debtor and the creditor side and can therefore be labeled 
“negotiated” as well.  
Concerning the choice of restructuring procedure, the IIF prefers the negotiated versions and 
puts faith in market discipline to achieve this goal: “In such cases where bondholders hold most 
of the debt, negotiated debt exchanges may be the appropriate process. Whereas non-negotiated 
debt exchanges have the advantage of being relatively quick, the lack of prior consultations and 
the `take-it-or-leave-it´ nature of some recent exchanges could have an adverse effect on the 
emerging market asset class generally and may impede the recovery process of countries that 
adopt a unilateral approach, even if the outcome is reflective of the existing market price” (IIF 
2002: 65). The experience of the last market-driven restructurings that included a debt write-
down (haircut) for bondholders (e.g., Russia (1998-2000), Ecuador (1999-2000), Moldova 
(2002), Argentina (2005) and Dominican Republic (2005)), however, tells a different story. In 
all of these cases the debtor countries opted for a rather non-negotiated exchange-offer so that 
in the last decade there has not been an effective creditor representation body or a bondholder 
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meeting related to sovereign emerging market debt.76 And this is not solely justified by a lack 
of majority voting provisions by the bonds involved. In Pakistan, for example, bond clauses 
allowed for a majority voting, but the debtor decided not to call for a negotiated process, as it 
feared that this would foster coordination among creditors and potentially lead to a more 
unfavorable result (ECB 2005: 15). However, up to now, there have been no disadvantages in 
the treatment of Pakistani bonds that can be related to this choice of the restructuring process. 
And in the case of the Argentinean debt exchange-offer, the debtor simply ignored the request 
by several representation bodies to engage in constructive consultation and presented an 
extremely painful take-it-or-leave-it offer solely in cooperation with its financial advisers. But, 
despite this harsh treatment of its creditors and the still unresolved issue of the creditors who 
did not accept the exchange-offer, Argentinean debt currently trades at spreads lower than 
Turkey and only slightly higher than Brazil. Thus, the argument that market discipline will 
implement negotiations lacks credibility. 
Why should the debtor country prefer a non-negotiated exchange-offer? An exchange-offer 
exhibits intra-creditor coordination failures that benefit the debtor and lead to an unfavorable 
result for the creditors in comparison to a bondholder meeting. One of these failures is that due 
to the heterogeneity of creditors, an exchange-offer enables the debtor to inter-temporally 
discriminate among different creditors. In order to support this argument, it is helpful to show 
in a simple bargaining model that, taking the optimal behavior of creditors into consideration, 
the debtor favors discrimination among creditor types with different reservation values in the 
exchange-offer unless negotiation is costless to both sides.  
                                                 
76 Although there have been some creditor representation bodies in the Argentinean debt restructuring, their 
influence was rather limited as the debtor country did not engage in negotiations with these institutions 
(Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006: 165-201). 
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IV.3. Heterogeneity and Inter-temporal Discrimination 
In a simple bargaining model the debtor makes an exchange-offer ( tω ), e.g., as a percentage of 
repayment per one dollar debt, in a repeated ultimatum game.77 Each creditor Ni∈  can just 
decide whether to accept the offer or reject it, which would yield a payoff of zero to both the 
debtor and the creditor (at least until the next round of bargaining). If the offer contains a debt 
write-down, which is usually necessary to end solvency crises, then each creditor faces 
impairment costs related to the write-down of ik .
78 In order to keep the model simple, 
following linear utility functions for the debtor and the representative creditor i  are assumed: 
(1) ttDU ωω −= 1)(  and ]0),1(max[),( tititC kkU i ωωω −−=  
Thus, due to the opportunity for creditor i  to reject any exchange-offer that would result in a 
negative utility, there is a reservation value )( i
i kω  for acceptance.  
                                                 
77 In this game we assume that contract enforcement is solely determined by the bargaining process so that no 
third-party enforcement is available. Further, we assume that the maximum payment capability of the debtor is 
normalized to one so that the exchange-offer can be regarded as a percentage of this maximum amount. 
78 Impairment costs might, e.g., be caused by a lack of mark to market valuation of financial assets or a lack of 
portfolio diversification. In addition, Engelen and Graf Lambsdorff (2007) have shown that fairness considerations 
in the form of inequality aversion can also have an influence on reservation values. 
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This shows that the reservation value for creditor i  is determined by the impairment costs for 
this creditor and is independent of time: 
(2) 
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kk += 1)(ω  
Further, it demonstrates that if the creditor has already written off the debt before the 
restructuring so that the costs of making concessions approaches zero ( 0→ik ), then this 
creditor will accept any non-negative exchange-offer ( 0→iω ). In contrast, if it is extremely 
painful for the creditor to accept any reduction in the net present value of debt claims ( ∞→ik ), 
then this creditor will not accept any exchange-offer below unity ( 1→iω ), as it would result 
in a negative utility for him or her.  
In order to keep it simple, creditors can be either of just two types, “low type” with 0=lk  or of 
“high type” with 0>hk . As has been demonstrated above, these different concession costs will 
lead to type-specific reservation values, where 0=lω  and 
h
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79 The reservation 
                                                 
79 Hence, the stationary equilibrium strategy for each creditor is determined by his nominal reservation value. 
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values indicate that a high type creditor only accepts exchange-offers that have a nominal value 
above hω , whereas the low type creditor would accept any non-negative offer as long as it is 
not preferable to reject for strategic reasons.80 
Debtor’s value is normalized to one, and debtor and creditors have identical bargaining costs, 
which are captured by a discount factor 1<δ . Creditors are heterogeneous, with the low type 
creditors being more favorable for the debtor, as these creditors would be satisfied with lower 
repayments than the high type creditors. Let the share of low type creditors be denoted by μ  
and the share of high type creditors by μ−1 . Since the debtor cannot make different exchange-
offers simultaneously, she might therefore be tempted to delay settlement with some creditors, 
as this enables her to inter-temporally discriminate among different types.81 This would mean 
that exchange-offers would be low in the beginning and rise over time until she eventually 
solves the dispute by offering the highest reservation value ( hω ).82 However, she must take 
into consideration that low type creditors can act strategically so that accepting must be 
incentive-compatible for them. This limits the set of potential exchange-offers, as all of them 
must lie on the equilibrium offer path that makes the low type creditors indifferent, Gul et al. 
(1986) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991: 408-410).  
Therefore the equilibrium exchange-offer path can be determined: When bargaining has 1+n  
rounds – where n  is the number of cut-off shares which will be derived later – than the 
                                                 
80 However, in this example there are gains of trade for both types of creditors so that bargaining will end in finite 
time, whereas in a case when the bargaining lacks gains of trade for at least one type of creditors, the bargaining 
will end in infinite time only. See appendix for the case of infinite bargaining. 
81 In order to distinguish the debtor from the creditor side we refer to the debtor as she. 
82 For obvious reasons the debtor will never launch an exchange-offer that is higher than the highest reservation 
value among creditors. 
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equilibrium offer for period ]1,...,1[ +∈ nt  is determined by  
(3) htnt ωδω −+= 1  
In order to get an impression of this equilibrium offer path, a simple example is given. Let us 
assume that there are only two rounds of bargaining ( 1=n ). The low type creditors know that 
the debtor will offer the high type reservation value in the second period so that hωω =2 . 
Hence, the lowest possible offer in period 1=t  which induces all low type creditors to accept 
in the first period is hδωω =1 . It becomes clear that this is the only optimal offer in the first 
period, as the debtor could reduce any offer above that level and thereby increase his payoff 
and still guarantee acceptance by the low type creditors. In contrast, any offer below this level 
would result in all creditors’ rejecting the offer so that the debtor is not able to discriminate 
among different types of creditors. 
Conclusively, when potential exchange-offers are prescribed by this determined equilibrium 
path, the only choice variable left for the debtor is how many rounds the bargaining will have. 
As will be shown, the resulting debtor behavior is characterized by certain cut-off levels for the 
share of low types creditors ( nμ ) because the higher the share of (more favorable) low type 
creditors, the higher the potential gain from discrimination. Hence, the higher the share μ , the 
more attractive it becomes for the debtor to delay the settlement. Labeling the number of cut-
off-levels by n  than the negotiation between debtor and creditors will include 1+n  rounds of 
exchange-offers ( 11,..., +nωω ).  
Now let us determine the first cut-off-level 1μ . For any share equal to or above this cut-off 
level, it is favorable for the debtor to spread a settlement over two periods of bargaining rather 
than one: 
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(4) )1()1()1()1( hhh ωωδμδωμ −≥−−+−  
Therefore, the first cut-off level is when this equation holds with equality so that  
(5) )1( hωαμ −≡≥  
This shows that whenever αμ > , there is more than one round of bargaining, as the debtor can 
increase her payoffs by inter-temporally discriminating among creditor types.83 Low type 
creditors accept the first exchange-offer 1ω  with probability one. 
Moreover, when the share of low type creditors is above a second cut-off level β , the debtor 
has an incentive to spread the bargaining process with its creditors over more than two periods. 
It is important to notice that when bargaining has more rounds than types (two in this example), 
the debtor inter-temporally discriminates not only among different types but also among 
creditors of the same type. But this is only possible when at least some creditors apply a mixed 
strategy to their voting so that acceptance of this type of creditors is strictly below unity. For 
the debtor it becomes preferable to have at least three rounds if the share of low type creditors 
exceeds the second cut-off level. Thus, equation (4) becomes 
(6) )1()1()1()()
)1(
)(1()1(
)1(
)( 2 hhh V ωδμδωμαδα
αμωδα
αμ −−+−≥−
−−+−−
−  
Where )(αV  is the continuation value for the debtor when the current share of low type 
creditors is α . From the arguments above we know that )1()( hV ωα −= . The decisive 
difference in the term for the second cut-off level is that in order to have more than two rounds 
                                                 
83 Eq. (5) further shows that when there are no gains of trade for the highest type ( 1≥hω ), bargaining would not 
end in finite time. The debtor would always have an incentive to postpone the settlement with the highest type for 
one more period into the future. 
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of bargaining, low type creditors must play a mixed strategy. As can be seen from (4) for the 
first cut-off level, low type creditors had a pure strategy which was either to accept or reject 
with certainty. When bargaining has more than two rounds, this changes because it would not 
be optimal for the debtor to delay settlement to the third round when low type creditors vote 
unanimously. Thus, the sequence of exchange-offers made by the debtor induces the low type 
creditors to accept with a probability 
)1( αμ
αμ
−
− , which is strictly below unity as long as there is 
at least one high-type creditor ( 1<μ ). 
In order to get a better impression of creditors’ voting behavior, let us assume that the debtor 
has made an exchange-offer in time 1=t  with a value of hωδω 21 = . Now, if the creditors 
believe that the debtor will make an exchange-offer hδωω =2  in the next round, they are 
indifferent, which by assumption induces them to accept the current offer. But if they would 
accept this exchange-offer with certainty, the share of low type creditors in the next period 
would be below the first cut-off level α . Consequently, in the next period the debtor would 
have an incentive to settle with all remaining creditors by offering the high type reservation 
value hω , contradicting their initial beliefs of hδωω =2 . Therefore, with altered beliefs the low 
type creditors would accept the current exchange-offer with probability zero as 
hh δωωδω <= 21 . However, this would result in a share of low type creditors above α  in the 
second period, which induces the debtor to discriminate in the next period by offering less than 
the high type reservation value. Hence, the only probability of acceptance sustainable in an 
equilibrium is the mixed strategy described above, as this renders a share of low type creditors 
equal to α .  
Taking these arguments, one can determine the second cut-off level, which is reached when 
equation (6) holds with equality:  
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(7) 
)1()1)(1()1(
)]1()1[(
2
2
hhh
hh
ωαδδωαωδ
ωδωδαβμ −−−−−−
−−−≡≥  
This leads directly to the following proposition, which summarizes the previous results: 
Proposition 1: There is a sequence of cut-off shares ( 1...0 210 <<=<=<= βμαμμ ) that 
determines the optimal number of bargaining rounds 1+n , so if ),[ 1+∈ nn μμμ , there are 1+n  
rounds with exchange-offers determined by htnt ωδω −+= 1  for ]1,...,1[ +∈ nt . Proof: Follows 
from the arguments made on the previous pages. 
As the bargaining in this model is a zero-sum-game, the advantage for the debtor is mirrored in 
lower total payments to the creditors and an efficiency loss, as there is no immediate settlement 
and bargaining costs ( 1<δ ). It is noteworthy that the coordination failures in this model result 
from the fact that each creditor votes independently, lacking the possibility to pre-commit on a 
voting procedure that would only allow for unanimous acceptance. Thus, an exchange-offer 
will provide the opportunity for the debtor country to use this coordination failure for its 
benefit. This would also likely be true in the case of a negotiated exchange-offer, since the 
opinion of a creditor representation body’s lacking sufficient competencies (e.g., a Creditor 
Group described by the IIF) would not have a major impact on this result. This is because, even 
in the presence of consultation, each creditor primarily decides according to his reservation 
value and not according to an external recommendation. The ignorance during the Argentinean 
restructuring of both the Argentinean government and the majority of creditors towards the 
recommendation of different representation bodies is a good example of the ineffectiveness of 
sole moderation. Only a representation body that is able to effectively bind in all creditors (e.g., 
the restructuring via a bondholder meeting) could mitigate this failure in the coordination of 
diverting creditor interests. Therefore, the current prevailing contractual approach exhibits a 
major deficiency by allowing the debtor to opt for the preferred negotiation procedure.  
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IV.4. Pre-Commitment via a Creditor Trust 
Although a Creditor Group as proposed by the IIF Action Plan would lack this competence, it 
might be possible to create a creditor representation body with sufficient power to consolidate 
divergent creditor interests so that the debtor country would voluntarily engage in negotiation. 
This institution would then not only function as a moderator between the debtor and its 
numerous creditors but would also take the position of a trustee of creditors’ rights.84 Hence, 
this essay proposes to improve the contractual approach for sovereign restructuring by making 
the Creditor Group a Creditor Trust (CT).85 
This would make the CG the trustee of private sector creditors so that bargaining power will be 
centered in one institution, which will guarantee the highest degree of assertiveness vis-à-vis 
the debtor country.86 However, as this might limit individual creditor rights, it is important that 
the members of the CG are elected solely by the creditor side in accordance to the structure of 
different types of creditors (e.g., retails vs. institutional investors, foreign vs. domestic 
investors). This is due to the fact that only if creditors feel adequately represented in the CT 
they would voluntarily pre-commit on certain majority voting procedures that might be 
necessary to foster unanimity among bondholders. The main goal of this CT is therefore to 
reach the consolidation of diverting creditor interests as voluntarily and consensually as 
                                                 
84 An example of a potential representation clause institutionalizing the relationship between the Creditor Trust 
and the bondholders can be found in the appendix.  
85 For a detailed description of trust within a sovereign debt restructuring and its differentiation with respect to a 
fiscal agent, see Buchheit (1998). 
86 Additionally, the CT would have to represent the interests of private creditors towards the official institutions 
that are involved in the restructuring process. A representation body that exhibits a strong bargaining power could 
also have an influence, such as in the example of the decision by the IMF in order to prevent lending into arrears if 
it is not in the best interest for private creditors. This would benefit the creditors’ position in the bargaining with 
the debtor. 
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possible. Already in the 19th century, bondholders realized that without an effective 
consolidation the representation of possibly diverting creditor interests in negotiation with a 
sovereign debtor would be weak, which lead to the foundation of the Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders (Mauro and Yafeh 2003).  
Comparable to the restructurings over the last decade most negotiations between the 1820s and 
the 1870s involved ad hoc creditor committees achieving only a poor performance from a 
creditor’s point of view. The reasons were a lack of specialization and experience as well as 
heterogeneity among creditors which lead to a weak coordination among creditors and 
sometimes even competing creditor committees. This changed with the establishment of an 
institutionalized creditor representation body, the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (CFB), 
in 1868 which was able to increase the effectiveness of creditor coordination significantly. This 
success, however, was achieved not until a reconstitution through an act of parliament in 1898 
which replaced a somewhat biased through a more balanced membership to represent all 
different groups of bondholders. The CFB had two main functions: First, to provide 
information about debtor countries to the bondholders and, second, to negotiate settlements 
with debtors and coordinate the different groups of bondholders. But the corporation did not 
have the legal authority to accept any restructuring terms. The negotiated restructuring 
agreement would only become valid after the CFB had asked the bondholder to vote on it. This 
institution still provides some valuable insights on how to reach collectiveness among 
creditors, as their mode of operation was guided by the idea that “the advantages of co-
operation are so great that there can seldom be sufficient ground for separate action,” (CFB 
Report 1873: 56).87 
                                                 
87 The annual reports of the CFB are available at http://collections.stanford.edu. 
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At the same time, the proposed procedure would provide a way to implement the recommended 
engagement clauses (G-10 Working Group 2002). These clauses seek a permanent creditor 
representation that would elect a representative in the negotiation with the debtor country if 
restructuring becomes unavoidable. Therefore, the PSAG or any of its consecutive institutions 
would be a permanent body for consultation that would initiate the formation of a CT for 
negotiation. And, as it is laid out in the Principles, the debtor would bear the costs of such a 
creditor engagement up to an amount jointly agreed on “based on generally accepted practices” 
(IIF 2006: 17). 
Comparable to the concept presented in Bartholomew, et al. (2004), a pragmatic way for the 
creation of such a Creditor Trust could be an exchange of bonds for Interim Trust Claims (ITC) 
that would represent a single creditor’s share in the trust.88  
 
Old Bonds
Creditors Creditor Trust
Creditor Trust Sovereign Debtor
ITCs
Old Bonds
New Bonds
Step I: Exchange of old bonds for ITCs
Step II: Trust converts old bonds in new bonds after approval by bondholder meeting
 
 
For aggregation of bonds with different financial terms, it might be necessary to issue more 
                                                 
88 Bartholomew, et al. (2004) initially proposed this two-step exchange process as an effective vehicle to 
overcome aggregation problems stemming from differences of jurisdictions, currencies, or financial terms of the 
original bonds involved in the restructuring. Using this process for the establishment of a Creditor Trust should, 
therefore, not cause major aggregation problems. 
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than one type of ITC so that combining different ITCs can replicate the original terms of the 
bond. The advantage of this situational approach is that both the composition of the board of 
the Creditor Trust as well as the terms of ITCs could be shaped on a case-by-case basis. This 
would guarantee the highest degree of flexibility, for example, with respect to differences in the 
creditor groups involved.89 In order to leave the creditors an exit strategy during the 
restructuring, the ITC could be traded on the secondary market instead of the original bonds. 
However, one caveat remains. Should the original bonds not allow for majority voting (e.g., 
bonds issued under New York law), there is still a potential incentive for some vulture funds 
not to swap their bonds for ITCs because even if the CT would combine a supermajority of the 
amount outstanding, he still could not change the financial terms of the bond. But the CT could 
amend the non-financial terms of the bonds so that holding out would become less attractive. 
This strategy is comparable to the threat of exit consents in current exchange-offers (Buchheit 
and Gulati 2002). But as long as clauses for majority restructuring and enforcement are not 
integrated in all bonds outstanding, there will not be full protection against single vulture funds 
trying to find judicial ground for litigation. Nevertheless, in the transition period to a common 
employment of these clauses, vulture litigation might discipline the debtor and thereby at least 
partially support the restructuring effort (Miller and Thomas 2006).  
Although negotiation is done by the CT, the voting power on any change of the financial terms 
of the original bonds would remain with the original bondholders (then the holders of ITCs). 
This is because if the CT regards the negotiated restructuring terms as a fair and sustainable 
                                                 
89 Creating incentives for creditors with low reservation values to participate in the CT would require that the 
terms offered under collective bargaining be higher than the receipts in the sequential structure. Setting thresholds 
for majority voting in the ITCs would have to take that into consideration.  
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result, it will call for a bondholder meeting to vote on these terms. The details of the voting 
procedure, e.g., the thresholds, could be specified by the PSAG when establishing the CT on a 
case-by-case evaluation. This would guarantee that the formulation of certain clauses in these 
ITCs could improve from time to time, as each restructuring would provide its own lesson for 
effective creditor coordination. Further, any limitation of creditor rights would be realized by 
an institution of creditors so that the negative effects of a potential third party intervention 
would be minimized (Shleifer 2003). 
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The idea of a trustee’s acting on behalf of the creditors is not new, as it is a valid option to 
ensure majority enforcement. Usually, the main purpose of a trust is to limit free-riding 
behavior by single creditors. Under the trust structure, litigation can only be undertaken by the 
trustee after it is requested by a prerequisite percentage of bondholders. Further, any proceed 
resulting from litigation is to be shared by the trustee among bondholders on a pro-rata basis. 
Therefore, the G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses and some private sector 
institutions (e.g., the International Primary Market Association) recommend this structure to be 
included in standard bond contract clauses. In spite of these recommendations, there is a 
substantial amount of skepticism within the private sector towards such a limitation of creditor 
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rights. But, according to Gray (2004), this is mainly due to the negative experiences of passive 
trustees in the U.S. sticking closely to the word of the indenture. However, this is not an 
argument against trustees in general but rather against tight mandates leaving little room for 
discretion. Thus, combining a well designed indenture of a trustee with the assignment of a 
creditor representation in the negotiation about the restructuring terms could result in an active 
trustee that would provide effective creditor coordination and a useful channel for 
communication. 
But, important for the credibility of the CT, the debtor country has no chance to present an 
exchange-offer that would be accepted only by some creditors. Therefore, it would be 
necessary that if the debtor country or any institution under its control buys ITCs on the market 
or launches an exchange-offer and receives ITCs, the voting rights associated with these claims 
would automatically migrate to the board of the CT.90 This would protect the process from the 
intra-creditor coordination failure of inter-temporal discrimination, as it would only allow for a 
vote that would be binding for all creditors.  
IV.5. Conclusion 
After years of intensive debate, the private sector has gained ownership of the resolution of 
sovereign debt crises that involve a large number of bondholders. The details of an 
institutionalized negotiation process, however, have not been finalized yet. Therefore, it is 
                                                 
90 The IIF principles ask for “fair voting” that would mean that any voting right owned by or under the control of 
the sovereign should have no influence on the voting. This is equal to a cancellation of these voting rights 
possessed by the sovereign because a debtor should not be given the right to vote on its own restructuring terms. 
However, this would increase the veto power of the remaining rights so that it might become more attractive for 
vulture funds to sabotage the restructuring. Therefore, in the presented CT proposal it is necessary that these rights 
are exercised, e.g., in favor of the recommendation made by the CT. 
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necessary to improve the contractual approach to sovereign debt restructuring. From the 
creditors’ perspective, the current state of this process still exhibits a major caveat, as it leaves 
an option for the debtor country to launch an exchange-offer. The debtor will prefer this option 
in comparison to a bondholder meeting, as the latter one might facilitate coordination among 
heterogeneous creditors. In an exchange-offer, the debtor enjoys the possibility to inter-
temporally discriminate among different creditors or creditor groups. This causes a lower total 
payoff to creditors and leads to an inefficient solution. Therefore, it should be in the creditors’ 
best interest to find ground for an effective representation that is able to consolidate diverting 
creditor interests and thereby mitigate this coordination failure. 
As this essay proposes the formation of a Creditor Trust initiated by a permanent creditor, a 
representation body (e.g., a Private Sector Advisory Group) could guarantee such mitigation 
because such an institution would secure that creditor voting on restructuring terms takes place 
only in a bondholder meeting so that the debtor has no chance of benefiting from the 
discrimination among creditors. A pragmatic way for the establishment of this Creditor Trust 
could be an exchange of old bonds for Interim Trust Claims that would, on the one hand, 
guarantee pre-commitment by the creditors and, on the other hand, provide the Creditor Trust 
with the necessary bargaining power for an effective creditor representation vis-à-vis the debtor 
country.  
Further, this would preserve the highest degree of flexibility to adjust both the composition of 
the Trust as well as voting or enforcement clauses carried by the Interim Trust Claims on a 
case-by-case basis. Therefore, such an approach would support creditor coordination and at the 
same time fulfill the requirements for restructuring techniques desired by the private sector as 
outlined in the IIF Action Plan: country-based, consultation-friendly, and market-based. 
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IV.6. Appendix 
A.1. The “No Gap Case” with Infinite Bargaining 
The ineffectiveness of intra-creditor coordination can even lead to a process of infinite 
bargaining. In order to show this it is helpful to slightly change the assumptions of the model. 
For simplicity impairment costs are assumed to widely differ among creditors so that 
reservation values are equally distributed over the interval )1,0(∈iω . Isolating the incentive to 
discriminate, the interdependence of reservation values is disregarded; hence there is no 
potential herding effect among creditors. Because of the assumption that there is at least one 
creditor who’s impairment costs approach infinity so his reservation value is equal to one, 
gains of trade exist for all creditors except for the one with the highest reservation value. This 
is called the “no gap case” as the highest reservation value equals the debtor’s value. In this 
setting, the bargaining game will end only in infinite time.  
Since bargaining costs the pie decreases each round by ( δ−1 ) with 10 ≤< δ  so that rejection 
imposes costs to the holdout creditors and leads to an inefficient solution.91 This causes 
strategic behavior which results in the debtor and creditor exhibiting the following strategies: 
ttt λϕϕλω )1()( −+=  and it r)1( ψψω −+≥  
The debtor offers a share ttt λϕϕλω )1()( −+=  of the pie to the creditor where tλ  describes the 
lowest reservation value of the creditors that rejected the offer at the beginning of period t. 
Updating causes tλ  to increase in case some creditors accept the current offer, the creditor i 
                                                 
91 Efficiency would require an immediate settlement. 
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accepts every offer that guarantees it r)1( ψψω −+≥ .92  
In order to better understand the strategies played in such a game, it is helpful to take a closer 
look at the parameters ϕ  and ψ . From the creditor’s strategy we know that 0>ψ  would 
increase the debtor’s reservation value. The reason is that ψ  is an indicator of the bargaining 
power that any creditor Nj∈  with 1<jr  has vis-à-vis the debtor as she can not simultaneously 
discriminate among creditors. Thereby it shows, what part of the debtor’s share ( jr−1 ) creditor 
j can claim in addition to his reservation value. Transforming the creditor’s strategy gives 
thereby ψω )1( iit rr −+≥ . The debtor will eventually have to pay the highest reservation value 
sometime in the future. So, if the costs of waiting are sufficiently low, it is preferable for the 
creditor to reject the current offer and wait for a better future one. The debtor, however, knows 
this strategic behavior by the creditors and adjusts her offer.  
Muthoo (1999: 275) shows that in an incentive-compatible equilibrium, it will hold that δϕψ = . 
The argument behind this equilibrium goes as follows: From the creditor’s strategy, we know 
that he accepts if ψω ≥−
−
i
it
r
r
1
 and from the debtor’s strategy we know that she offers 
ϕλ
λλω =−
−
t
ttt
1
)( . As the equilibrium strategy is stationary, which means independent of time, 
updating the debtor’s offer yields ϕω =−
−+
i
iit
r
rr
1
)(1 . As in equilibrium the representative creditor 
i is indifferent between acceptance and rejection his reservation value ( ir ) will also determine 
                                                 
92 It is important to notice that since the creditor sets its reservation value independent of time this causes the 
single creditor to be concerned only about the nominal value of the exchange-offer. But as this nominal value will 
probably not be reached until somewhere in the future he accepts a lower present value. So the creditor’s 
stationary equilibrium strategy might not be profit maximizing. 
IV. Inter-temporal Discrimination among Creditors 
 93
the value of the exchange-offer in the next period. Now, if δϕψ >  ( δϕψ < ) then this would 
mean that itit rr −<−+ ωωδ )( 1  ( itit rr −>−+ ωωδ )( 1 ) which would contradict the debtor’s 
(creditor’s) incentives. So, the only incentive-compatible equilibrium with stationary strategies 
is when δϕψ = . 
In order to derive the equilibrium behavior the debtor knows from the representative creditor’s 
strategy that if she offers a share tω  then the highest “type” of creditor that will accept this 
offer will be 
ψ
ψωω −
−=
1
)( ttir  
Moreover she knows that the relative share of creditor with a reservation value of ir  or lower is 
t
ti
i
rrG λ
λ
−
−=
1
)( .93 This enables her to compare the current profit of an offer with its impact on the 
potential offer in the next period. In each period reservation values of the remaining creditors 
are uniform on [ ]1,tλ . So, applying dynamic programming, the Bellmann equation with tλ  as 
the state variable and tω  as the control variable states: 
{ }))(())()(1(max)(
)1(1
tittitt rVrV
tt
ωδλωωλ λψψω +−−= −+>> . 
First-order condition is: 
0))(()21)(1( =′++−− tit rV ωδψϕλ  
                                                 
93 The equilibrium of the inter-temporal discrimination among creditors is equal to a repeated ultimatum 
bargaining game with one-sided incomplete information. The detailed derivation of this equilibrium can be found 
in Muthoo (1999: 273-285) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991: 405-407). The crucial difference to the case 
presented here is that )( irG  does not determine a relative share but a probability distribution for the different 
types of creditors. 
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With the evolution of the co-state variable:  
)1(
)1()1(
))((
2
ψ
λϕω −
−−−=′ ttirV  
Combining FOC and evolution of the co-state variable yields the Euler Equation: 
2)1()21)(1( ϕδψϕψ −=+−−  
Further we know that it must hold that δϕψ =  which results the two stationary equilibrium 
strategies: 
δψ −−= 11  and δ
δϕ −−= 11
 
For proof that this Equilibrium satisfies the Coase Conjecture, see Muthoo (1999) and 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). This conjecture states that (i) if the interval between rounds goes 
to zero, all potential gains from trade are realized without any delay, and (ii) the proposing side 
in the repeated ultimatum game looses all her bargaining power. 
This shows that unless bargaining is costless ( 1→δ ), it is always optimal for the debtor to 
inter-temporally discriminate among heterogeneous creditors or creditor groups and thereby 
lower her costs of restructuring. Hence the bargaining will not end in finite time.  
A.2. A Representation Clause 
An Example of a representation clause taken from Buchheit (1998) that would authorize the 
Creditor Trust (as the Trustee or Fiscal Agent) to moderate and coordinate the negotiation 
process but would keep the final decision about accepting or rejecting certain restructuring 
terms rested with the bondholders.  
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Coordination with other creditors  
(a) In the event that the [Trustee] [Fiscal Agent] receives written notice from the Issuer that the 
Issuer intends to seek a restructuring of the obligations evidenced by the Bonds in the context 
of a general restructuring of obligations owed to certain other creditors of the Issuer, the 
[Trustee] [Fiscal Agent] is authorized, without the need to convene a meeting of Bondholders 
or to seek the prior instructions of the Bondholders, to meet with the Issuer, other interested 
parties and representatives of such other creditors to discuss the circumstances giving rise to 
the restructuring request, the terms of any proposed restructuring of the Bonds and the 
proposed treatment of the obligations held by other creditors of the Issuer; provided that the 
[Trustee] [Fiscal Agent] shall have no authority in any such discussions to accept on behalf of 
any Bondholder, or to bind any Bondholder to, any modification of the terms of the Bonds 
falling within the proviso to Section [the provision requiring unanimous or super-majority 
consent to modifications of the payment terms of the Bonds].  
(b) In its sole discretion, the [Trustee] [Fiscal Agent] may delegate the authority given to it by 
this Section to participate in such discussions to another entity selected by it, including a 
committee representing bondholders generally or an entity that acts as a trustee in connection 
with other bonds of the Issuer. Prior to entering into any such discussions, the [Trustee] [Fiscal 
Agent], or any such delegate, shall advise each other participant in those discussions of the 
limitation set out in the proviso to clause (a) above. All expenses of the [Trustee][Fiscal 
Agent], or its delegate, incurred in connection with such discussions shall be for the account of 
the Issuer.  
(c) The authority given to the [Trustee][Fiscal Agent] by this Section shall automatically 
terminate as of the first meeting of Bondholders to occur following the date on which the 
[Trustee][Fiscal Agent] receives the written notice from the Issuer referred to in clause (a) 
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above unless the Bondholders shall have passed a resolution at that meeting (or at any 
adjournment thereof) authorizing the [Trustee][Fiscal Agent] to continue to act in this capacity.
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V. Description of recent Crises94 
V.1. Details of Restructuring Terms 
 Pakistan  
(1999) 
Russia  
(1999-2000) 
Ukraine  
(1998-2000) 
Ecuador  
(1999-2000) 
Moldova  
(2002) 
Uruguay  
(2003) 
Argentina  
(2001-2005) 
Dominican Republic 
(2005) 
Initiation and 
duration of 
restructuring 
The exchange-offer was 
launched in November 
1999 and was completed 
on 13 December. It was a 
requirement that the 
restructuring should take 
place under the Paris 
Club’s comparability of 
treatment clause. 
Defaulted on its 
restructured loans (PRINs) 
in December 1998. Six 
months later in June 1999, 
Russia defaulted on its 
interest arrears notes 
(IANs). An agreement was 
reached with the Bank 
Advisory Committee on 11 
February 2000 on a 
comprehensive debt and 
debt-service reduction 
operation. The exchange-
offer was launched on 18 
July 2000 and completed 
on 25 August 2000. 
After piecemeal attempts 
at earlier restructurings, 
Ukraine announced a 
comprehensive exchange-
offer in February 2000. To 
address inter-creditor 
Equity concerns, Ukraine 
decided not to make a 
principal payment due on 
one of the bond issues in 
January 2000 or a coupon 
payment due on another 
bond issue in February 
2000. As the grace period 
of both payments expired 
while the exchange-offer 
was still open, Ukraine 
was in default during the 
exchange. The exchange 
was completed in April 
2000. 
Defaulted on discount 
Brady bonds in September 
1999. Later defaulted on 
other Brady bonds and 
Eurobonds. Almost eleven 
months later, announced a 
comprehensive exchange-
offer on 27 July 2000, 
which was completed on 
25 August 2000. 
Initiated restructuring in 
June 2002. The final 
restructuring agreement 
was signed on 15 October 
2002 and became effective 
on 30 October. 
The exchange-offer was 
announced on 10 April 
2003 and successfully 
completed on 29 May 
2003, after the deadline for 
offers was extended by one 
week from 22 May to 
allow for further 
participation. During the 
one week extension 
participation rose to 93% 
and USD 5 billion out of 
USD 5.4 billion of eligible 
bonds were exchanged. 
Initiated restructuring of 
domestic and foreign debt 
in late October 2001 under 
a two-phase approach. 
Phase 1 was completed in 
December 2001. Phase 2 
eventually launched in 
January 2005 (closing date 
of 25 February 2005). 
In the course of the 
resolution of a banking 
crisis in 2003 debt level 
increased substantially 
implying unsustainable 
future debt payments. 
After the economy 
stabilized and growth 
returned the government 
decided to restructure the 
debt before the payments 
would become due in 
2006. 
                                                 
94 The tables are drawn from Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006: 256-261), Roubini and Setser (2004: 383-389), ECB (2005: 40-42) and Porzecanski (2005: 326); Author’s 
presentation. 
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Details of Restructuring Terms (continued) 
 Pakistan  
(1999) 
Russia  
(1999-2000) 
Ukraine  
(1998-2000) 
Ecuador  
(1999-2000) 
Moldova  
(2002) 
Uruguay  
(2003) 
Argentina  
(2001-2005) 
Dominican Republic 
(2005) 
Restructured 
debt 
Three Eurobonds with a 
face value of USD 608 
million, had bullet 
redemptions in the period 
December 1999 to 
February 2002, and 
coupons ranging from 6 to 
11.5%. One Eurobond had 
a put option exercisable on 
26 February 2000. 
The exchange covered 
claims estimated at USD 
31.8 billion. The claims 
were composed of about 
USD 22.2 billion of 
PRINS, USD 6.8 billion of 
IANs and USD 2.8 billion 
of PDI on PRINs and 
IANs. 
The exchange involved 
four Eurobonds with a face 
value of USD 2.3 billion 
and USD 1 billion of 
Gazprom bonds. Coupons 
on the instruments ranged 
from 8.5 to 16.75%. 
The instruments 
restructured were 
collateralised discount 
Brady bonds, 
uncollateralized past-due 
interest (PDI), interest 
equalisation Brady bonds, 
and Eurobonds with a total 
face value of USD 6.5 
billion. 
The exchange covered the 
only Eurobond issued by 
Moldova. The 5-year 
Eurobond, with an 
outstanding balance of 
USD 39.7 million, was due 
to mature on 13 June 2002 
The exchange involved 
nearly all market debt, 
accounting for about half 
of total sovereign debt. 
Eligible securities 
comprised 46 domestically 
issued bonds accounting 
for USD 1.6 billion of 
principal, 18 international 
bonds accounting for USD 
3.5 billion and one 
Samurai bond, accounting 
for USD 250 million. 
Under Phase 1, US dollar 
and Argentine peso bonds 
were eligible for exchange. 
The authorities accepted 
federal bonds with a face 
value of USD 41 billion 
and a further USD 9 billion 
in provincial debt. Under 
phase 2, the aggregate 
eligible amount was USD 
81.8 billion (comprising 
USD79.7 billion of 
principal and USD 2.1 
billion of accrued but 
unpaid interest as at 31 
December 2001). Unpaid 
interest since December 
2001 increases the total 
amount to around USD 
104billion. 
Authorities decided on a 
debt strategy that entailed 
a restructuring of external 
commercial banks and 
suppliers debt, a Paris Club 
rescheduling, the 
renegotiation of a Standby 
Arrangement with the 
IMF, and a restructuring of 
privately held external 
bonds. 
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Details of Restructuring Terms (continued) 
 Pakistan  
(1999) 
Russia  
(1999-2000) 
Ukraine  
(1998-2000) 
Ecuador  
(1999-2000) 
Moldova  
(2002) 
Uruguay  
(2003) 
Argentina  
(2001-2005) 
Dominican Republic 
(2005) 
Where payments 
missed prior to 
restructuring? 
No. Yes, initially for domestic 
debt, six months later for 
restructured Soviet era 
international debt. No 
default on Russian era 
international debt. Debt 
deal came two years after 
initial default. 
Several debt restructurings, 
without default prior to 
2000 restructuring. One 
principal payment missed 
just before 2000 exchange-
offer. 
Several debt restructurings, 
without default prior to 
2000 restructuring. One 
principal payment missed 
just before 2000 exchange-
offer. 
No. Debt negotiations 
started at the time of 
maturity of old bond with 
an initial restructuring 
agreement while final deal 
was negotiated. 
No. No. Debt negotiations 
started at the time of 
maturity of old bond with 
an initial restructuring 
agreement while final deal 
was negotiated. 
No. 
Scope (USD 
billion) 
0.6 31.8 3.3 6.8 0.04 5.4 81.8 1.2 
Number of 
Bonds 
3 3 5 5 1 65 152 2 
Principal 
Forgiveness 
No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
„Haircut“ on 
Discount Bonds 
(%) 
0 37.5 0 40 10 0 66.3 <3 
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Details of Restructuring Terms (continued) 
 Pakistan  
(1999) 
Russia  
(1999-2000) 
Ukraine  
(1998-2000) 
Ecuador  
(1999-2000) 
Moldova  
(2002) 
Uruguay  
(2003) 
Argentina  
(2001-2005) 
Dominican Republic 
(2005) 
Terms of 
restructuring 
Outstanding Eurobonds 
were exchanged for a new 
amortising bond with an 
overall maturity of six 
years, including a three 
year grace period, and a 
coupon of 10%. 
The PRINs and IANs were 
exchanged for new 30-year 
Eurobonds, which also 
featured below market 
interest coupons, a front-
loaded interest rate 
reduction and a 7-year 
grace period. The PDIs 
were exchanged for a 
special 10-year Eurobond 
at par, with a 6-year grace 
period. The amount of PDI 
exchanged was equal to 
the outstanding amount 
minus a cash payment of 
USD 270 million. 
Claims were exchanged for 
new amortising 
instruments with maturities 
of seven years, including a 
grace period of one year. 
Investors were offered a 
choice of a euro-
denominated Eurobond 
bearing a coupon of 10%, 
and a USD-denominated 
Eurobond with an 11% 
coupon. 
Bondholders were given 
the option to swap the 
defaulted bonds into a 
single global USD-
denominated stepup 30-
year bond, with an option 
to convert the 30- year 
bond into a USD-
denominated 12-year bond 
for additional debt 
reduction. The new bond 
included a principal 
reinstatement clause to 
reduce the risk of future 
default by Ecuador and 
amortising features. 
Under the exchange, 
creditors received an 
immediate cash payment 
of 10% of the outstanding 
principal (USD 3.97 
million) and a new 7-year 
amortising bond. The 
amortisation schedule was 
back-loaded. 
Investors were offered a 
choice between two 
options. Under the 
“maturity extension” 
option, each existing bond 
could be exchanged for a 
bond with similar coupon 
and extended maturity 
(generally 5 years longer), 
combined in some cases 
with a 30-year bond. 
Under the “benchmark” 
option investors received 
one of a smaller number of 
benchmark bonds, which 
were long-dated but more 
liquid than under the 
maturity extension option, 
also combined in some 
cases with a 30-year bond. 
Under Phase I all eligible 
US dollar and Argentine 
peso bonds were 
exchanged for new 
domestic loans with a 
reduction of interest rates 
to 70% of the contractual 
level, a grace period for 
interest until April 2002, 
and a three year extension 
of maturity in the case of 
bonds maturing up to 
2010. Under phase 2 
holders can swap into four 
bonds maturating between 
2033 and 2045 including a 
GDP-linked bond. 
A voluntary bond 
exchange-offer with 
guaranteed full payment of 
holdouts. 
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Details of Restructuring Terms (continued) 
 Pakistan  
(1999) 
Russia  
(1999-2000) 
Ukraine  
(1998-2000) 
Ecuador  
(1999-2000) 
Moldova  
(2002) 
Uruguay  
(2003) 
Argentina  
(2001-2005) 
Dominican Republic 
(2005) 
Debt Relief The exchange resulted in 
an increase in the face 
value of the bonds by USD 
6 million. However, there 
was a significant cash-flow 
relief in the first year of 
the exchange of USD 539 
million. 
The exchange resulted in a 
reduction in the face value 
of the bonds by USD 13.4 
billion (of which PRINs 
and IANs accounted for 
USD 10.6 billion, 
frontloaded interest 
reduction in Eurobonds 
accounted for USD 2.5 
billion and PDI accounted 
for USD 270 million) or 
42% of the restructured 
debt. The cashflow relief 
provided by the exchange 
averaged about USD 1.7 
billion per year (for the 
first 14 years). 
The exchange resulted in 
no reduction in the face 
value of the bonds, but 
yielded cash-flow savings 
of USD 835 million in the 
first year and USD 719 
million in the second. 
The exchange resulted in a 
reduction in the face value 
of the bonds by USD 1.8 
billion or 27% of the 
restructured debt. The 
cashflow relief provided 
by the exchange equalled 
about USD 349 million in 
the first year (100%) and 
USD 506 million in the 
second year (71%), or 
about USD 1.5 billion in 
the first five years (42%) 
The exchange resulted in a 
reduction in the face value 
of the bonds by USD 4 
million or 10% of the 
restructured debt. The 
cash-flow relief provided 
by the exchange was USD 
33 million in the first year. 
The exchange resulted in a 
reduction in the face value 
of the bonds by USD 49 
million. The exchange 
yielded cash-flow savings 
of USD 411 million in the 
first year and USD 192 
million in the second year, 
or about USD 1.6 billion in 
the first five years. The 
NPV of future flows on 
new bonds was about 20% 
less than the NPV of pre-
exchange flows, when 
discounted at a common 
factor (16% – the implied 
yield when the exchange 
was launched). 
Computing haircuts for the 
phase 1 exchange is 
complicated by the lack of 
a secondary market for the 
new domestic instruments 
after the exchange. 
Estimates by Sturzenegger 
and Zettelmeyer (2004) 
give upper and lower 
bound estimates of 
between 50% and 25%. 
The phase 2 exchange 
resulted in a hair cut of 
around 75%. 
Coupon rates were 
unchanged but with 
interest payments for 2005 
and 2006 partially 
capitalized. Maturities 
were extended by five 
years. Using a yield of 
about 10 percent results 
haircuts of 0.14 and 2.67 
percent. 
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V.2. Details of Creditor Coordination 
  Pakistan  
(1999) 
Russia  
(1999-2000) 
Ukraine  
(1998-2000) 
Ecuador  
(1999-2000) 
Moldova  
(2002) 
Uruguay  
(2003) 
Argentina  
(2001-2005) 
Dominican Republic 
(2005) 
Investor base  Roughly one third of the 
restructured bonds were 
held by domestic residents 
with the rest held by 
financial institutions and 
retail investors from the 
Middle East. US and 
European investment 
firms had only small 
holdings of the debt. 
Of the restructured debt, 
about 70% was held by 
domestic banks and the 
remainder by non-
residents. 
The three bonds which 
contained CACs were 
held by a relatively 
limited number of 
investment banks and 
hedge funds. The 
remaining issue was 
widely held in the retail 
sector in Europe. 
Widely held by 
institutional investors in 
New York and London 
who had substantial 
holdings of emerging 
market debt. 
Collective action 
problems were minimised 
by the fact that a single 
asset management 
company held 78% of 
outstanding bonds. 
More than half of all 
bonds were held by 
domestic investors, which 
were to a large extent the 
retail sector. The Samurai 
and euro-denominated 
bonds had a large retail 
investor base in Japan and 
Europe respectively. 
International Dollar-
denominated bonds were 
widely held by 
institutional investors in 
the United States. 
The debt restructured in 
phase 1 was held by 
banks, local pension funds 
and local residents. 0f the 
debt to be restructured in 
phase 2 about 50% is 
estimated to be held by 
domestic financial 
institutions (roughly equal 
numbers of banks and 
pension companies), 20% 
by European retail 
investors, 3% by Japanese 
retail investors, and the 
remaining 27% is largely 
held by US institutional 
investors. 
N/A 
 
V. Description of Recent Crises 
 103
Details of Creditor Coordination (continued) 
 Pakistan  
(1999) 
Russia  
(1999-2000) 
Ukraine  
(1998-2000) 
Ecuador  
(1999-2000) 
Moldova  
(2002) 
Uruguay  
(2003) 
Argentina  
(2001-2005) 
Dominican Republic 
(2005) 
Relations with 
official creditors and 
IMF 
Eurobond restructuring 
triggered by Paris Club 
demand for comparable 
treatment 
Four weeks before the 
default, the IMF provided 
a financial package in an 
attempt to stave off the 
crisis, but did not provide 
additional financing when 
this package failed. A year 
later, the IMF negotiated a 
new Standby Arrangement 
and lent into arrears as the 
government was 
negotiating its 
restructuring 
In 1998, new IMF 
financing was made 
contingent on a debt 
restructuring. 2000 
restructuring occurred 
while Ukraine had an IMF 
supported government 
(through this was off track 
for unrelated reasons), and 
IMF supported exchange 
1999 default was related 
in part to IMF decision 
not to lend unless Ecuador 
restructured its debts. IMF 
lent into arrears prior to 
2000 debt exchange, and 
supported the exchange 
Lending from 
multilaterals had stopped 
in 2001 for unrelated 
reasons. Following the 
decision to restructure, 
IMF made one more 
disbursement before 
program went off track 
again 
Debt restructuring 
occurred in the context of 
an IMF-supported 
program, and the IMF 
supported the exchange 
IMF supported Argentina 
prior to 2001 default, and 
the default was partly 
triggered by the IMF’s 
decision to suspend 
lending. IMF lent into 
arrears between January 
2003 and March 2004, but 
suspended its lending in 
mid-2004, in part because 
it disagreed with the 
authorities’ approach to 
the restructuring 
Debt restructuring 
occurred in the context of 
an IMF-supported 
program, and the IMF 
supported the exchange 
Where bondholders 
treated differently? 
No. All bondholders face 
similar NPV haircut 
Yes. Some bonds were not 
defaulted; and haircuts 
varied both across 
exchanges and within the 
GKO exchange. Domestic 
institutional creditors 
received better terms in 
the GKO exchange 
In domestic debt 
restructurings domestic 
holders obtained better 
terms but face capital 
controls. In the 2000 
international restructuring 
NPV haircuts were fairly 
similar (slightly lower on 
longer term bonds) 
NPV haircuts lower on 
longer term bonds. 
Treatment of holders of 
domestic dollar debt and 
shorter term international 
debt broadly similar 
No. Only one bond 
restructured; haircut 
received by second 
commercial creditor 
(Gazprom) about the same 
Haircuts were relatively 
small and similar for 
externally issued debt and 
long term domestically 
issued debt. Short term 
domestically issued 
suffered somewhat higher 
haircuts 
Yes, both across 
exchanges, and within, 
particularly within the 
Phase 1 and Pesification 
exchanges. In 2005 
exchange local pension 
funds obtained a slightly 
better deal 
No. Haircuts were close to 
zero for both bonds 
V. Description of Recent Crises 
 104
Details of Creditor Coordination (continued) 
 Pakistan  
(1999) 
Russia  
(1999-2000) 
Ukraine  
(1998-2000) 
Ecuador  
(1999-2000) 
Moldova  
(2002) 
Uruguay  
(2003) 
Argentina  
(2001-2005) 
Dominican Republic 
(2005) 
Relation with 
creditors 
No formal negotiations, 
but communications with 
small group of 
bondholders 
Negotiations with foreign 
banks. 2000 restructuring 
was negotiated with a 
Bank Advisory 
Committee (“London 
Club”) 
No formal negotiations No formal negotiations, 
but convened a 
consultative group of 
institutional creditors 
Restructuring negotiated 
with a single creditor 
holding 78 percent of the 
bond that was restructured 
No formal negotiations, 
but government stressed 
the importance of 
communication with 
bondholders and 
conducted two “road 
shows” 
No formal negotiations, 
but contact with 
consultative groups 
established by the 
government, and several 
self declared creditor 
committees 
No formal negotiations 
but authorities stressed the 
importance of this being a 
voluntary exchange 
Exit consents Not used Not used Used Used Not used (negotiated deal) Used Not used Used 
CACs All three outstanding 
bonds contained CACs, 
but not used 
Not used In three bonds that 
contained CACs, used 
pre-emptively in 
conjunction with exit 
consents to back 
exchange-offer 
Outstanding bonds did not 
have CACs, new bonds do 
not have them 
Used to bind minority 
Eurobond holders 
Used in the case of one 
(Samurai) bond. New 
bonds contain both CACs 
and an aggregation 
provision lowering the 
CAC voting threshold 
depending on support 
across bonds 
Some outstanding bonds 
contained CACs, but they 
were not invoked. New 
bonds issued in 2005 
exchange contain both 
CACs and an aggregation 
provision lowering the 
CAC voting threshold 
depending on support 
across bonds 
New bonds contain both  
CACs and an aggregation 
provision lowering the 
CAC voting threshold 
depending on the support 
across bonds 
Holdouts and 
litigation 
No holdouts (few 
creditors) 
1 percent holdouts, paid in 
full (refers to PRINs/IANs 
exchange) 
2 percent holdouts, paid in 
full 
2 percent holdouts, paid in 
full 
No holdouts (collective 
action clause invoked) 
7 percent holdouts, paid in 
full 
23.85 percent holdouts, 
which have not been paid 
nor offered any alternative 
at time of writing. 
February 2005 Law 
prevents government from 
settling with these 
creditors 
3 percent, paid in full 
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